Thanks, Doug. The letter in support of the new TRFRA amendment bill, which
would have omitted substantial as a modifier, does not mention the removal of
substantial, but is in support of the bill.
If there is anyone who signed it who opposes removal of substantial, please
let me know.
Just FY (forgive me if I missed an earlier reference)I believe there is
such a bill in Wisconsin as well ?
Sent from my iPhone
On Dec 2, 2013, at 10:18 AM, hamilto...@aol.commailto:hamilto...@aol.com
hamilto...@aol.commailto:hamilto...@aol.com wrote:
Thanks, Doug. The letter in support
The WIs bill was never passed to my knowledge, but if it went through under the
radar, I would be interested.
Conn did not include the term in one of the earliest bills, but the Conn
Supreme Court read it in. To my knowledge, only
KY passed such a bill, and only over the Governor's veto.
What I said is in the second letter (link below) and summarized in the
e-mail to which you responded. We supported the bill as drafted, without
substantial; I also suggested that the committee restore substantial if
it were bothered by the omission. I think most of my co-signers would have
agreed
Connecticut and Alabama use burden instead of substantial burden. New
Mexico, Missouri, and Rhode Island don't use the burden terminology--they speak
of restrictions on religious liberty. To me, that would seem like it
jettisons the requirement of burden altogether, but others may disagree.
Apologies to anyone getting this twice; I think it bounced the first time.
What I said is in the second letter (link below) and summarized in the
e-mail to which Marci responded. We supported the bill as drafted, without
substantial; I also suggested that the committee restore substantial if
Thanks. A more informed version of what I said in the second letter to the TX
legislature.
Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From:
Chris-- As I mentioned, CT's has been amended through interpretation You are
right about Alabama.
I actually think these terms matter and removal of substantial violates the
Establishment Clause but it also shows the endless push by religious entities
to overcome all laws. I assume the
Again I have not seen any evidence that differences in phrasing--burden,
substantial burden, restriction on religious liberty,--have caused any
differences in result (or even reasoning). If you have examples, I'd love to
know about them. If not, it suggests the differences in phrasing
The Texas municipal league and civil rights groups -- especially those
protecting children's and women's and gay rights -- would disagree w the notion
substantial is irrelevant. And the TX legislature had no interest,
or so I am told by those groups on the ground in Texas. I don't want the
Sure, but what evidence did they have? That is, what evidence did they have
that any of the differences in phrasing--burden, substantial burden, or
restriction on religious liberty,--would matter in deciding cases?
Again I may be wrong about this and I really would like to be corrected if I
I'm curious about how this response relates to your response to Chris Lund, in
which you cited the Madisonian assumption that every group will seek the
maximum amount of power. It reminded me of this profile of Valerie Jarrett:
It has certainly made a difference in RLUIPA cases. I have to say I find it a
little hard to believe these cases can be generalized across states given how
few there are and how different each state operates procedurally, but I look
forward to reading your article and will keep an open mind.
What they had was the reality of politics and the forces arrayed against them.
As one said to me, if it doesn't make a difference why try for a
constitutional amendment to delete it and fix it permanently?
In federal court, substantial burden has been a difficult hurdle for claimants.
Absolutely. They all have lobbyists. I don't view the term as necessarily
perjorative. Just descriptive.
Marci A. Hamilton
Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School
Yeshiva University
@Marci_Hamilton
On Dec 2, 2013, at 2:10 PM, Paul Horwitz phorw...@hotmail.com wrote:
Fair enough.
On Dec 2, 2013, at 2:10 PM, Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com wrote:
Absolutely. They all have lobbyists. I don't view the term as necessarily
perjorative. Just descriptive.
Marci A. Hamilton
Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School
Yeshiva
When a new TRFRA was introduced in Texas earlier this year, I was told that
there was a letter submitted signed by approximately 16 law professors
who supported the removal of substantial from the typical RFRA analysis.
Doug had said on this list that he would send it to me several months ago,
I assume this is the letter, although it does not specifically address the
removal of substantial:
http://txvalues.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Professor-Support-Texas-Religious-Freedom-Amedment-Senate-version.pdf
On Sun, Dec 1, 2013 at 9:03 AM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote:
When a new TRFRA
Thanks Marty!
Marci A. Hamilton
Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
(212) 790-0215
http://sol-reform.com
-Original Message-
From: Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
To: Law Religion
The presence or absence of the word substantial was briefly addressed in a
follow-up letter here:
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/laycock/texasreligfreedamdt2013senate2corrected.pdf
I defended the word's omission. I also suggested that the Committee add it if
they thought it mattered.
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