[The following is a hypothetical only, as I don’t pretend to know everything
about the parties and their views.]
Suppose that you are a solo law practitioner in the town where Arlene’s Flowers
is located. You have long known that Barronelle Stutzman has strong
traditionalist religious views,
Eric, I agree that it is discrimination. I thought I was clear about that.
I would grant a free exercise exemption, assuming another vendor is available
without undue difficulty, principally for two reasons. First, for believers
like Baronelle Stutzman, a wedding is an inherently religious
I think that's right -- but I'm curious about whether there
would indeed be viable objections to a criminal prosecution, whether for
violation of the injunction or for violation of the underlying statute. (I
assume that prosecution for violation of an injunction is more likely
As someone whose recent work has centered largely on the inability to neatly
separate Jewish law from culture, I would conclude that for those who observe
this practice, it should be viewed as a religious practice. Not all customs
have the force of Jewish law--this is a very complex area. But
Some of you may be familiar with the *Washington v. Arlene's Flowers* case,
which will be argued in the Washington Supreme Court next month.
Barronelle Stutzman and her husband are the owners of Arlene’s Flowers,
Inc., a closely held for-profit corporation. Over the course of nine
years, Stutzman
Thanks; I recognize the underlying question left open from Smith of whether the
existence of any exemptions (scientific research) but no religious exemption
triggers strict scrutiny.
Mike
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh,
I did not sign the scholars’ brief, and it is drawing about the reaction I
expected. But nothing in the brief implies anything like the Ollie’s BBQ
analogy.
The claim in the brief is that discrimination confined to one very narrow
context, an especially sensitive context with its own legal
I did not sign the scholars’ brief, and it is drawing about the reaction I
expected. But nothing in the brief implies anything like the Ollie’s BBQ
analogy.
The claim in the brief is that discrimination confined to one very narrow
context, an especially sensitive context with its own legal
I assume Doug was referring to Arlene's Flowers' free exercise claim under
Art. I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution, which the state court
has construed in Sherbert/RFRA-like fashion. Although I don't think the
religious exercise claim should prevail in this commercial context, I do
