Not being an artist, I might not know. However, from my reading of artists, I would submit that artists may have intentions but may more often have what they would term as inspirations. We might term the "inspirations" as intentions but that might not be the artist's experience. I might be more suspicious of something purporting to be a work of art if the artist was working more from intention than inspiration. I might not value an inspired work but I would mistrust an intended work. I do agree that the merit/valuing of a work is independent of the artist's intention.
Geoff Crealock

From: William Conger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: "Meaning" is always in a mind, never in an object.
Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2008 17:29:51 -0700 (PDT)

How you you know that what you like about your design is the implication that it will be well received by those whom you respect...and might provoke those you don't? In other words, are our art intentions really our own or are they collectively fostered by others from whom we want approbation? It's fine by me if intentions are not our own. I think artists must have intentions to be motivated to do their work and to guide its completion but I don't think intentions can validate or invalidate the work as art. Thus I think intentions are necessary but not sufficient.

WC


--- On Sat, 8/30/08, armando baeza <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> From: armando baeza <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: "Meaning" is always in a mind, never in an object.
> To: [email protected]
> Cc: "armando baeza" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Saturday, August 30, 2008, 7:19 PM
> When I finally arrive at a design that I'm excited
> about, my intent
> is finished. What others sense, is irrelevant to me.
> So where does the truth lie?
> mando
>
> On Aug 30, 2008, at 3:25 PM, William Conger wrote:
>
> > Robert Frank's photos and films are known
> precisely because they
> > convey a raw, unadorned view of how people
> unintentionally manifest
> > their social habits and styles. Which is to say he
> achieves what he
> > set out to do. His disclaimers are honorific.  Besides
> we can never
> > assume that what the artist (author) says about
> intentionality is
> > true. See The Intentional Fallacy.
> > WC
> >
> >
> > --- On Sat, 8/30/08, joseph berg
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> From: joseph berg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >> Subject: Re: "Meaning" is always in a
> mind, never in an object.
> >> To: [email protected]
> >> Date: Saturday, August 30, 2008, 5:01 PM
> >> - My photographs are not planned or composed in
> advance, and
> >> I do not
> >> anticipate that the onlooker will share my
> viewpoint.
> >> However, I feel that
> >> if my photograph leaves an image on his mind,
> something has
> >> been
> >> accomplished.
> >> Robert Frank
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sun, Aug 24, 2008 at 10:25 AM,
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> "Meaning" is always in a mind, never
> in an
> >> object.
> >>>
> >>> Whenever we look upon (or hear, or taste, or
> smell, or
> >> even palp) an
> >>> object,
> >>> the sense data each mind receives is more or
> less
> >> different from the next
> >>> mind's receipt, and each mind then
> >> "processes" it differently.
> >>>
> >>> The processing is largely a matter of
> associating the
> >> immediate sensations
> >>> with other notion already stored in memory.
> That
> >> inventory of memories,
> >>> plus the
> >>> intricacies of our associating apparatus,
> result in
> >> new notion that can be
> >>> of
> >>> wide variation from mind to mind -- variation
> and
> >> degree of "recognition".
> >>>
> >>> If confronted by an elaborate mathematical
> formula,
> >> many of us can go no
> >>> further than perhaps "recognizing"
> it as a
> >> mathematical formula, while a
> >>> mathematician's mind goes bounding on to
> all sorts
> >> of new notion. When
> >>> confronted with
> >>> a scription in a foreign alphabet, many of us
> may
> >> think, "Well, it's
> >>> eastern
> >>> Asian," -- and be wrong because it turns
> out to
> >> be ancient African or
> >>> something.
> >>>
> >>> What most of us have in mind when we talk of
> an
> >> object's "meaning" is
> >>> solely
> >>> in our heads, a somewhat
> "recognizable"
> >> notion. Thus when confronted with a
> >>> scription we are told is Attic Greek, we may
> say with
> >> a chortle, "It's all
> >>> Greek
> >>> to me!" Or, more seriously, "Well
> it's
> >> meaningless to me." When we say
> >>> that,
> >>> what we have in mind is the fact that our
> associating
> >> mind has not come up
> >>> with notion that we can "get a grip
> on",
> >> grasp, recognize to some degree.
> >>>
> >>> And that's where our lingo begins to
> mislead us.
> >> We commence saying it's
> >>> the
> >>> scription -- or poem, or painting, or strange
> sound --
> >> that is with or
> >>> without
> >>> meaning.
> >>>
> >>> If a scholarly woodsman sees elaborate
> markings on a
> >> tree, he may wonder
> >>> what
> >>> "their meaning" is. If the markings
> turn out
> >> to be the clawings of a bear,
> >>> he
> >>> may say, "Ah! So they're
> meaningless."
> >> But a second woodsman may demur:

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