Frances to Cheerskep and interested others...
Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general
philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the
thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the issue
of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for
convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of
objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual idea
of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the
human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature
and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by
only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism,
notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main
consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that
it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems
problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly antirealist. In
its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be
usefully applied to a broader realist position within the
pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to resolve
of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be
applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from
mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach
here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to
better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions.
(By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a
realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and
antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line
for address.)
