So would you say that an artwork depicting something real expresses less than what the artist feels or experiences?
On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 5:12 PM, armando baeza <[email protected]>wrote: > I feel that a related reality in art is not sufficient to satisfy the > reality one senses. > In art the, 'subjectively personal' is the only avenue available to us. > > > On Mar 20, 2010, at 1:25 PM, imago Asthetik wrote: > > Cheerskep's "cherishable" >>> is as close as one can get to express reality as sense >>> >>> >> What leads you to believe this, Mr Baeza? could you explain a little >> more? >> >> >> >> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 2:51 PM, armando baeza <[email protected] >> >wrote: >> >> My point is in reference to realistic art making. Cheerskep's >>> "sherishable" >>> is as close as one can get to express reality as sense , to others. >>> A cherishable expression will always be our only alternative in art, yet >>> as broad as the minds can sense. >>> AB >>> >>> >>> On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:42 AM, imago Asthetik wrote: >>> >>> I suppose my remark was intended to thematize an ambiguity in Mr Baeza's >>> >>>> use >>>> of 'subjective.' For the most part, Mr Baeza seems to use 'subjective' >>>> in >>>> a >>>> sense consonant with 'personal.' However, what is personal need not be >>>> contrary to what is objective. My private life is personal, though it >>>> could >>>> be objectively related to others, and exists in the same manner as >>>> tables >>>> and chairs. The personal specificity of my love for someone may not be >>>> readily communicable to others, but it is nevertheless manifest and >>>> objective even if I am unaware of the hows involved in communicating it. >>>> >>>> Mr Conger's reformulation of the matter in terms of tacit and explicit >>>> knowledge (what one used to call, I think, knowing-how and >>>> knowing-that), >>>> is >>>> a subtler way of formulating the point. Naively, I had in mind the idea >>>> that one may only grasp a specific sense of an expression (e.g. 'toe the >>>> line') which one uses without thereby eliminating the larger field of >>>> publicly available and objective connotations and denotations that make >>>> the >>>> expression 'objective,' semantically rich and evocative. More >>>> succintly, >>>> Mr >>>> Baeza might find the word personal (and Cheerskep's 'cherishable') more >>>> appropriate and appealing than 'subjective'. >>>> >>>> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 11:06 AM, William Conger < >>>> [email protected] >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>> >>>> The real topic here is tacit and explicit knowledge. A new book from >>>> the >>>> >>>>> Univ. Chicago Press by Harry Collins deals with that subject. Imago >>>>> seems >>>>> to be referring to tacit knowledge when he says, "One says more, means >>>>> more,....than one actually knows". >>>>> wc >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ---- >>>>> From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> >>>>> To: [email protected] >>>>> Sent: Sat, March 20, 2010 12:58:48 AM >>>>> Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs >>>>> >>>>> Is it no the other way around, Mr Baeza? It is not ones expression >>>>> that >>>>> is >>>>> subjective, but ones own understanding of it. One says more, means >>>>> more >>>>> and >>>>> better, than one actually knows. >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 1:07 AM, armando baeza <[email protected] >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> what is sense, cannot be expressed as sensed, beyond you. >>>>> >>>>>> Ones expression will always be subjective. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Frances Kelly wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Frances to Cheerskep and interested others... >>>>>> >>>>>> Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general >>>>>>> philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the >>>>>>> thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the issue >>>>>>> of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for >>>>>>> convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of >>>>>>> objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual idea >>>>>>> of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the >>>>>>> human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature >>>>>>> and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by >>>>>>> only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism, >>>>>>> notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main >>>>>>> consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that >>>>>>> it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems >>>>>>> problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly antirealist. In >>>>>>> its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be >>>>>>> usefully applied to a broader realist position within the >>>>>>> pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to resolve >>>>>>> of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be >>>>>>> applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from >>>>>>> mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach >>>>>>> here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to >>>>>>> better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions. >>>>>>> (By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a >>>>>>> realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and >>>>>>> antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line >>>>>>> for address.)
