I suppose my remark was intended to thematize an ambiguity in Mr Baeza's use of 'subjective.' For the most part, Mr Baeza seems to use 'subjective' in a sense consonant with 'personal.' However, what is personal need not be contrary to what is objective. My private life is personal, though it could be objectively related to others, and exists in the same manner as tables and chairs. The personal specificity of my love for someone may not be readily communicable to others, but it is nevertheless manifest and objective even if I am unaware of the hows involved in communicating it.
Mr Conger's reformulation of the matter in terms of tacit and explicit knowledge (what one used to call, I think, knowing-how and knowing-that), is a subtler way of formulating the point. Naively, I had in mind the idea that one may only grasp a specific sense of an expression (e.g. 'toe the line') which one uses without thereby eliminating the larger field of publicly available and objective connotations and denotations that make the expression 'objective,' semantically rich and evocative. More succintly, Mr Baeza might find the word personal (and Cheerskep's 'cherishable') more appropriate and appealing than 'subjective'. On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 11:06 AM, William Conger <[email protected]>wrote: > The real topic here is tacit and explicit knowledge. A new book from the > Univ. Chicago Press by Harry Collins deals with that subject. Imago seems > to be referring to tacit knowledge when he says, "One says more, means > more,....than one actually knows". > wc > > > ----- Original Message ---- > From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: Sat, March 20, 2010 12:58:48 AM > Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs > > Is it no the other way around, Mr Baeza? It is not ones expression that is > subjective, but ones own understanding of it. One says more, means more > and > better, than one actually knows. > > On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 1:07 AM, armando baeza <[email protected] > >wrote: > > > what is sense, cannot be expressed as sensed, beyond you. > > Ones expression will always be subjective. > > > > > > On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Frances Kelly wrote: > > > > Frances to Cheerskep and interested others... > >> Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general > >> philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the > >> thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the issue > >> of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for > >> convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of > >> objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual idea > >> of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the > >> human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature > >> and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by > >> only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism, > >> notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main > >> consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that > >> it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems > >> problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly antirealist. In > >> its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be > >> usefully applied to a broader realist position within the > >> pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to resolve > >> of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be > >> applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from > >> mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach > >> here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to > >> better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions. > >> (By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a > >> realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and > >> antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line > >> for address.)
