> Cheerskep's "cherishable" > is as close as one can get to express reality as sense >
What leads you to believe this, Mr Baeza? could you explain a little more? On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 2:51 PM, armando baeza <[email protected]>wrote: > My point is in reference to realistic art making. Cheerskep's "sherishable" > is as close as one can get to express reality as sense , to others. > A cherishable expression will always be our only alternative in art, yet > as broad as the minds can sense. > AB > > > On Mar 20, 2010, at 9:42 AM, imago Asthetik wrote: > > I suppose my remark was intended to thematize an ambiguity in Mr Baeza's >> use >> of 'subjective.' For the most part, Mr Baeza seems to use 'subjective' in >> a >> sense consonant with 'personal.' However, what is personal need not be >> contrary to what is objective. My private life is personal, though it >> could >> be objectively related to others, and exists in the same manner as tables >> and chairs. The personal specificity of my love for someone may not be >> readily communicable to others, but it is nevertheless manifest and >> objective even if I am unaware of the hows involved in communicating it. >> >> Mr Conger's reformulation of the matter in terms of tacit and explicit >> knowledge (what one used to call, I think, knowing-how and knowing-that), >> is >> a subtler way of formulating the point. Naively, I had in mind the idea >> that one may only grasp a specific sense of an expression (e.g. 'toe the >> line') which one uses without thereby eliminating the larger field of >> publicly available and objective connotations and denotations that make >> the >> expression 'objective,' semantically rich and evocative. More succintly, >> Mr >> Baeza might find the word personal (and Cheerskep's 'cherishable') more >> appropriate and appealing than 'subjective'. >> >> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 11:06 AM, William Conger <[email protected] >> >wrote: >> >> The real topic here is tacit and explicit knowledge. A new book from the >>> Univ. Chicago Press by Harry Collins deals with that subject. Imago >>> seems >>> to be referring to tacit knowledge when he says, "One says more, means >>> more,....than one actually knows". >>> wc >>> >>> >>> ----- Original Message ---- >>> From: imago Asthetik <[email protected]> >>> To: [email protected] >>> Sent: Sat, March 20, 2010 12:58:48 AM >>> Subject: Re: Phenomenology of Signs >>> >>> Is it no the other way around, Mr Baeza? It is not ones expression that >>> is >>> subjective, but ones own understanding of it. One says more, means more >>> and >>> better, than one actually knows. >>> >>> On Sat, Mar 20, 2010 at 1:07 AM, armando baeza <[email protected] >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>> >>> what is sense, cannot be expressed as sensed, beyond you. >>>> Ones expression will always be subjective. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Frances Kelly wrote: >>>> >>>> Frances to Cheerskep and interested others... >>>> >>>>> Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general >>>>> philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the >>>>> thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the issue >>>>> of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for >>>>> convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of >>>>> objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual idea >>>>> of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the >>>>> human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature >>>>> and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by >>>>> only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism, >>>>> notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main >>>>> consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that >>>>> it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems >>>>> problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly antirealist. In >>>>> its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be >>>>> usefully applied to a broader realist position within the >>>>> pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to resolve >>>>> of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be >>>>> applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from >>>>> mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach >>>>> here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to >>>>> better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions. >>>>> (By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a >>>>> realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and >>>>> antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line >>>>> for address.)
