what is sense, cannot be expressed as sensed, beyond you. Ones expression will always be subjective.
On Mar 19, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Frances Kelly wrote:
Frances to Cheerskep and interested others... Approaching signs as phenomena when studied under the general philosophy and formal science of phenomenology may avoid the thorny problems encountered by thinkers when addressing the issue of an origin or cause and source or limit for signs, which for convenience such frames might be reduced mainly to that of objectivism or relativism or subjectivism. If the conceptual idea of signs should be limited to only the brain and mind of the human being, who likely should also be held as normal and mature and even advanced, then signs would be supplied and supported by only some kind of subjectivism, such as psychologism, mentalism, notionalism, nominalism, perceptualism, or rationalism. The main consequence of accepting this sort of stance and thrust is that it excludes signs from the nonhuman arena. This limit seems problematic and even unnecessary. It is certainly antirealist. In its defence as a special theory, subjectivism might however be usefully applied to a broader realist position within the pragmatist science of phenomenology. The initial thorn to resolve of course is whether the theory of signs as phenomena might be applicable to all forms of phanerisms and as signers, from mechanisms of matter to organisms of life. My primary approach here would be to wrestle with realist phenomenology in order to better understand it, before making any definitive conclusions. (By some accounts the theory of conceptualism is held as a realist tool to bridge the gap between idealist objectivism and antirealist subjectivism, but that issue also must wait in line for address.)
