I'm glad Boris says "for me" because he feels that saying that justifies 
whatever he claims.  Not so.  Our personal opinions gain weight only in 
relation 
to broader societal opinions and the divisions of those into a variety of codes 
or rules which we accept or deny.  The important thing is to engage those codes 
and test one's opinion against them by discursive analysis.  It may be useful 
to 
know how Boris defines genius and profound spiritual influence but that takes 
us 
only to Boris but why should we agree with him or why should we disagree with 
him?  We either agree or disagree or are indifferent.  Boris says nothing that 
may persuade us to his opinion.  No examples, no societal approbation, no 
appeal 
to belief systems and, important for societal persuasion, no rewards and no 
punishments by which I mean no coercion.  

Coercion is the underpinning of most beliefs and opinions, whether codified by 
law or might. If you hold such and such opinion and act in accordance to it, 
you 
have something to gain and something to lose.  We can even apply this to 
aesthetics.  We are easily persuaded to adapt our experience of art to some 
rule 
or habit or standard for the sake of obtaining the elusive but reward in the 
form of "aesthetic experience".  In the absence of such coercion, in the 
disarray of rules or habits, we rely on our natural solipsism and cannot find a 
common aesthetic principle.  That's the era we live in today.  In the past 
people didn't worry so much about aesthetics because it was more of less 
recognized as a product of such and such coerced behavior.  Now we all worry 
about aesthetics and recognize that nothing suffices to explain it.  One 
available choice is to forget it altogether and to say it doesn't exist as a 
plausible art benefit.  Another choice is to say it exists universally as a 
experiential benefit common to all consciousness and maybe it's art that 
doesn't 
exist as an independent category of experience.  Thus maybe art needs to be 
coercive.  Welcome to identity art, political art, and all the other art that 
illustrates how your social acts and beliefs will earn you rewards or 
punishments.
  
wc


----- Original Message ----
From: Boris Shoshensky <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Thu, October 14, 2010 8:49:04 PM
Subject: Re: is aesthetics dead?

For me genius is not so much one who changed formal or stylistic approach. It
is just new important step in the evolution of arts.
Genius for me is a profound spiritual influence changing the nature of human
culture. It includes forms/ techniques, emotions, taste and other components
of a creative process leading to the masterpiece.
Boris Shoshensky
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: is aesthetics dead?
Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2010 12:44:45 -0700 (PDT)

My claim rests on the assumption that terms such as genius and talent cannot
be
discerned as intrinsic to any object.  We can and do, however, pretend that
they
can and then we devise various measures (codes) by which we claim, again
without
any inherent evidence, that whatever our measuring identifies is the trait we
seek.

Here's an example:  The formalist history of Western art is predicated on the
identity of style and its evolution over time.  This methodology naturally
centers on the instances where changes in style occur and then, more
specifically what those formal changes were and who initiated them. Giotto is
regarded as a genius artist because he was among the very first and likely
the
most assured artist to renew a rational illusion of pictorial space in
painting.
Thus the measure of genius here is "a renewed way to portray depth on a flat
surface" and various historical documents from Giotto's time and our
comparison/contrast with hindsight  point to Giotto as the most significant
author of that change. Other artists of his time followed his new style but
since they only imitated him they are not geniuses although a broader measure
(like refinement of line) might qualify them as talented. There is nothing in
the artwork, nothing in the line, nothing in the artists, that can be pointed
to
as genius aside from the predetermination of the measure (stylistic change).

Art historians then look for evidence that Giotto's renewed illusionism
influenced other artists and, lo, they find evidence they seek. Then it
occurs
that one of those artists upped the ante by fogging up the new illusionism
with
obfuscating light and shadow and so there is a new genius.  Thus if genius is
tied directly to influential stylistic change, then one simply looks for
those
changes in surviving artworks and then one can find the geniuses.  These
geniuses can be qualitatively ranked by new measures, such as the degree of
stylistic change they introduced or by other qualities, like personal charm
(see
Vasari) or market value (then and now).

So, art history provides artificial templates for genius and then whoever
best
fits the templates, becomes the genius.  The templates are artificial and
extrinsic to inherent qualities of art or people.  Changing the templates,
like
changing the rules of a game, might produce a different set of geniuses.
That
is precisely what is going on now in art history.  For example instead of
style
as the foundation of art, now it's cultural patterns, codes, discourses.  New
templates are being devised that are comfy with the preoccupations of
contemporary society and are retro-fitted to past artworks and as a result,
new
geniuses will be "discovered".  Move over, Giotto.

When you say that people often agree on ascriptions of talent and genus, I
ask
if they are agreeing to accept predetermined judgments or have they all come
to
the same judgment by their own study of the evidence (which I claim above, is
spurious)?  Truth is, the Institutional Theory is the pragmatic theory of
choice.  We say so and so was/is a genius because some "artworld" authority
has
said it for us.

The notation of genius or even talent (is that propositional genius?) is
determined by many different means and I agree that most of them are
Institutional but nowadays even that is up for grabs and a sort of
market-defined template is in first place.  More than ever, anyone can
designate
the genius and the most respected "objective" proof is in the marketplace
where
money is the measure.  Ask a 100,000 dollars for your kid's latest dabble and
if
you get it, the kid's a genius. It's happened. Or better yet, if you can
claim
celebrity of any sort, then make artworks.  You will be a genius because your
celebrity stands in for quality.  That happens a lot. Imagine, If Henry VIII
had
fired Holbein and made his own portraits because he was the greater celebrity
he
would by today's standards be a genius artist and Holbein a hack.   Now and
then
some new "objective" measures are devised.  Currently, there are a spate of
art
contests with huge money awards which are decided entirely by public vote
(direct democracy in action).  I suppose the few winners can be deemed
geniuses
to be explained in art discourse.   But is this much different from the
so-called MacArthur Genius grants which are determined in secret by an
unknown
panel with unknown aims.  So far all their choices have been as predictable
in
terms of elite "institutional"  taste as the new big prize art winners are
predictable in terms of popular mass taste.  Show me the template and I'll
show
you the geniuses. If there's no template in place, then there's no way to
determine genius, or talent, or failure either.  There is nothing
pre-existing
about templates, nothing inherent to them, and thus there is nothing inherent
to
genius.  One way or another, it's a societal way to organize values which are
themselves transient and inherently empty.  Ain't it great that there are no
preordained rules?
wc






----- Original Message ----
From: Rupert Dasilva <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sun, October 10, 2010 12:58:31 PM
Subject: Re: is aesthetics dead?

Your stance is contrary to experience of the way in which the terms 'talent'
and
'genius' are used. People very often agree on both ascriptions of talent or
genius, and
also on the reasons for these ascriptions. It might be the case that these
ascriptions,
and the reasons for them, are not particularly interesting, and this might

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