On Sunday 07 September 2003 10:46, Jef Allbright wrote:
> Jef wrote:
> Arnoud, it appears there is agreement that qualia exist -- as a very real
> illusion. The "problem" of qualia, however, seems to be the question of
> how to represent/implement qualia in a thinking machine (assuming this must
> be designed-in for true and full consciousness.)
Qualia by their definition (ineffable, non-causal etc.) have no function, can
have no function in the system, that I do agree with Dennett ('quining
qualia'). I also agree with Dennett that if the behaviour of a system is
completely explained nothing remains, all extra ontology is just redundant
metaphysics. Eliminate it by Ockham's razor; like William James said: 'every
difference must make a difference.'
The misconception seems
> to go back at least as far as Descarte making the fundamental error of
> "Cogito, ergo sum"
Nothing wrong with that, like also there is nothing wrong with 'I ride my
bicycle, therefor I am'. Als long as 'I' is not reified into some internal
ferry tale entity. 'I' refers to the *person* that speaks or writes it. What
descartes did was abuse of language.
, and thereby based an entire ontology on separation
> between the observer and the observed.
Well there is of course a separation, I perceive a table, but I'm not it. My
observation is part of me however (in some sense).
Following Descartes for centuries
> now, many philosophers have assumed that "internal experience" is naturally
> more pure and direct than "external experience", which is degraded by the
> limitations of sensory apparatus. This way of thinking implicity assumes
> the existence of an observer,
Well naive realism does that also (and scientific realism also). They differ
from the Empiricism you describe that there is not an observer in the
observer. That leads to an infinite regress as Ryle showed in 'The concept of
mind'.
who must be sending and receiving signals
> with the outside world. Given such a observer, then it seems it should be
> possible to monitor (or model) the incoming signals and gain a full
> understanding of the nature of qualia.
Yes, that's what Husserl tried to do with his phenomenology (and failed
miserably. Very interesting though.).
The existence of qualia and an entity called self are not necessarily coupled.
There can be qualia but no 'mind's I'.
(Terms like 'the self', 'the ego' etc are completely insane reifications;
first they are made substantives and then they are taken to refer to existing
entities. Two very wrong moves. A good dosis of ordinary language philosophy
from Ryle and Wittgenstein is a good cure. W:'Philosophical problems occur
when language goes on holiday.')
>
> The paradox disappears if the view is widened to see that there is no
> independent self to do the observing.
That leads to the infinite regress of Ryle.
There are many processes occurring
> within the brain, the body, and even extending outside the body, that
> together form the experience of self.
Sorry, but I don't experience a self. I see cows in the grass, I see the sky,
I see myself in the mirror, I feel pain when I stumble over a chair and
pleasure when I drink wine etc.. All this talk about 'experience of self' is
presented as 'raw first-hand experience', but it is in fact high theoretical
clumsy talk, twisting the meaning of words.
Studies have shown there is no
> single mind "driving" the human vehicle, in fact very often the internal
> voice identified as our concious self is rationalizing (explaining in a
> very creative way) actions already performed by other processes within the
> brain and after the fact playing catch-up and saying "*I* did that."
I read that in a book by Gazzaniga (neurocoginitive science). Very
interesting. Of course Dennett also points out again and again that the brain
fools itself, covering its mistakes/ignorance.
I think the 'illusion of self' can better be described as 'illusion of
coherence (at all time)', 'illusion of complete planning', 'illusion of
control', 'illusion of rationality' or something like that.
>
> No matter how this system of interacting processes is queried about what it
> thinks is going on, the "self" is going to report that it "experiences"
> qualia.
Well 'qualia' is already itself a theoretical term. What the brain actually
thinks is that there really are object and processes out there with the
properties qualia represent; the brain is not realistic about qualia, it is
naive realistic. E.g. I can't help thinking that I'm typing on a grey
keyboard that feels hard, smells like coffee, sounds 'tick' when I hit it ...
There's not just grey and the smell, there's the keyboard that has these
properties. Operationally/Behaviourally we are all naive realists.
Locke made the irrealism move by making a distinction between real qualities
which were properties of things, and unreal qualities which were just our
representations of them. Physics and naive realism have drifted apart ever
since. We have become a bit schizopfrenic; we have a 'manifest image' and a
'scientific image' (W. Sellars) of the world.
The notion of qualia is very much based on this theorisation. Qualia can only
exist, if there's this split of the world into appearances and reality; exist
independently that is, otherwise they're just properties of things and we are
simply naive realists.
And well, the distinction is justified (based on the success of science and
the practical ineliminatability of the manifest image), and so the qualia
are.
That's what it is built to do. From its limited point of view, it
> is perfectly correct. From a wider point of view the qualia are only an
> emergent property
ontologically, functionally or??
of a multitude of separate but interconnected processes.
>
That sounds all very plausible, for physicalistic folk we all are here at the
agi list (I suppose), but still, your point of view is too eliminative,
ontologically, for me.
And well, there is no reason to be eliminative, physics still has some subtle
ontological space as I pointed out (The 'hard problem' of physics), and
qualia fit it like a glove, in a grandiose metaphysical picture. Qualia are
the dreams stuff is made of ;-)
Arnoud
PS do you speak Dutch? (retorical question) The problem is so subtle, the
language we use clearly isn't a good medium to solve it in, just to blur it
in. (Well, in Dutch the same effect occurs)
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