At 10:16 29.11.2002 +0100, you wrote:
I think everyone agrees that this would be absurd or impractical for a variety of reasons. When discussing equity, however, these reasons may not be all that relevant. We might find that there is some ideal that we would wish to have realised, even if this ideal for practical reasons may be unattainable. For instance, we could discuss what the "perfect energy source" would be characterised by, without claiming that it can actually be found in practise.> John Hull wrote: > > Um, no. Force would be bad. You could sweeten the > > deal for her, however, using perhaps pecuinary > > benefits to level the field. > Assuming you are not just joking, this implies that things such as "ability to atract mates" should be taken into account when redistributing income today.
The question, as I see it, is whether we wish to defend the de facto differences in 'welfare' that we see around us as morally right, and if so, on what basis. One could argue, as Charles Murray has done, that incentives are required for society to function, even if no individual "deserves" to be better off than any other in some metaphysical sense. In other words, one might believe that everyone should be equally well off in an ideal world, but that the attempt to realise this would cause a collapse in society as no one would then have an incentive to produce anything. Or one could argue, as it seems some people do in this group, that there are moral criteria that can be used to determine how much each individual deserves, and that this ideal distribution is indeed realised by the market.
Here's a thought experiment that may illustrate one reason why this "market distribution is the correct distribution" seems problematic to some: Imagine that all babies born each week were pooled and then reassigned randomly to the parents. Your adult personality, opportunities and welfare would to a large extent be a function of the parents you drew in this lottery. You could end up in the household of a millionaire or a single mum working at McDonalds. Is your luck in this draw morally relevant? Is the difference in welfare outcomes morally acceptable? And, returning to our real world, to what extent is the present criteria for the assignment of infants to parents (based, ordinarily, on genetic factors) reflective of merit?
Ole
