> > > > result of actions taken by Israel do indeed have a *legal right*
> > > > to return of their rightful property and to take up residence in
> > > > such properties.
> > >
> > > No, they can be offered fair compensation instead, which WAS
> > > offered!
> >
> > No, they have a legal right to return an repossess real property of
> > their respective estates. If they or their soverign collective freely
> > accepts compensation then the compensation is defined as "fair" and
> > the matter is put to rest (in theory). Were I a Palestinian
> > negotiator, accepting compensation and fixing the amount of
> > compensation would all be barganing points that I would try to recycle
> > into more meaningful concessions from the opposite delegation.
>
> Read up on your international law. Also, we offered all we could,
> indeed more than that and too much IMHO. We're dealing with a
> religious people, a significant majority of who HATE Israel. I want
> peace, but not at any price.
I assume that you are saying that under international law the stroger party
can discharge latent property rights unilaterally by offering (just) monetary
compensation. The consent of the alienated parties or their sovereign agent
is not required.
That would not surprise me. However, in the case of East Germany and
Poland I think the standard was *return* of property. Return is certainly
the standard for Jewish art. (Though art does not have the pragmatic
implications of real property and its improvements.)
Item 1) There is no shortage of hatred for Jews among Arabs, and
Palestinians in particular.
1.1) It is reasonable to generalize and say that Arab peoples hate Jews
1.1.1) A partial exception is made for the Maghreb, and Morocco in
particular.
2) In light of 1.1 can Israel make a meaningful peace with Palestine.
I think the answer is yes. However, it will not be a very peaceable sort of
peace. There will be considerable terrorist activity and the peace itself is
partly secured by division and relative weakness of and in Palestine in the
shorter term (the decades after establishing a sovereign polity.)
2.1) In light of the Israeli assessment of needs relative to 1.1 and 2 can
Israel offer minimally acceptable terms to Palestine.
This is unknown. Rabin could have come close. Barak came close.
However, you indicated that the Knesset and Israeli public would never
ratify the Barak deal, this means he really offered nothing at all.
I read Nettanyahu's book. His plan was to Reserver or Bantustanize the
Palestinian population. They would have no sovereignty and just enough
autonomy to force local strongmen to take responsibility for the security of
Israel and its citizens at the expense of the Palestinian populace. This is
exactly what he seemed to do when in office.
The basic problem is that there are too many Palestinians to ram this
deal down their throats.
Historically Sharon has gone even farther and come close to advocating ethnic
cleansing and subsequent anexation of the occupied territories.
It is actually a workable plan. Provided that Israel is willing to pay
the short and medium term costs. Also it means either acting cynically
vis-a-vis the long history of anti-Jewish expulsions in Europe or (worse)
resorting to ultra-orlthodox special pleading that since Jews are a special
people it is ok for them to do to non-Jews what non-Jews should not do to
Jews...at least in Zion.
Also, I am not certain that Sharon is actually implementing the plan.
However, it is clear he is utterly un-interested in a land-for-peace deal
with Palestine.
=============================
Finally, let me say that it is not clear that the Israelis actually want
peace.
There is substantial evidence that the Israeli public wants security, not a
long-term peace.
In the short term (again on the order of decades) land-for-peace with
Palestine will produce *less* security.
Under direct occupation the IDF can engage in direct repressive measures to
limit terrorist acts and Judeophobic propaganda. The resulting level of
insecurity can be considered a reference background level.
Under peace the Palestinian security forces cooperate with Israeli
counterparts but even in a repressive regieme have to take more account of
public oppinion and in more humane regimes even give considerable latitude to
the civil rights of the citizenry. The result is a *higer* level of
insecurity in the "early" stages of peace than under direct occupation.
This raises the question of why Israel has any interest in land-for-peace.
First, direct occupation takes a toll on her youth. Second it takes a toll
on the republic. Third it gives scope to the @#$% fascist fundamentalist
settlers and results in a divisve national debate. Even so, the calculus
doesn't work out.
This effects the rational approach that the Palestinians bring to the context
for negotiations. They need to demonstrate that land-for-peace is rational
for Israel. They try to ratchet up the stakes once Israel tips its hand
that the peace process is a farce designed with zero consideration for
Palestinian concerns. Palestine thus escalates the level of insecurity by
engaging in low intensity, asymetric warfare. Not only does the PNA stop
cooperating on security once it is evident that good faith negotions are off,
they even stop regulating the most extreme elements in their own society.
Why should they?
Stage one: Intifada
Response: Reluctant negotiations
Stage two: Cease fire
Result: Interminable negotiations
Stage three: Increased insecurity due to PNA automony and peace
Result: Israeli backlash
Result: Rollback even of limited gains under faux negotiations.
Stage four: Resumed negotiations
Result: More Israeli stalling.
Result: Palestinian leadership concludes:
If we have security Israel has no incentive to negotiate
If we have insecurity Israel insists on security as pre-condition to
negotiations.
Result: produce more insecurity grading into state of war.
(Rationale: convince Israelis that peace is for the prevention of war, not to
produce a state of absolute security.)
