Dan: So, why did the firebombings of Dresden and Tokyo present tremendous military advantages over simply targeting factories, airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, etc. for bombing?
Dan M. Me: Actually, Dan, when I wrote that, I wasn't even thinking about the firebombings. I don't really have a huge problem with them - the progressive devaluation of standards that took place during the war made them nothing more than a logical progression - but I _hope_ that had I been involved with the decisions at the time I would have said no. They were not militarily justified. What I was referring to were the strategic bombing campaigns, _in general_, all of which were pretty indiscriminate about civilian/military targets. Some history of the bombing campaigns come next, so just skip it if that sort of stuff bores you. The Luftwaffe initially focused on military targets during the Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe, however, entirely lacked any strategic bombing arm - it's entire military structure was essentially designed for operational and tactical air support, and this was one of its major handicaps during the war. There was no German counterpart to the B-17. A British raid on Germany (Britain _did_ have a strategic bombing arm, under "Bomber" Harris) that was directed at military targets accidentally, however, hit some civilian ones in Berlin. This triggered the Blitz, as Hitler thought it was on purpose (apparently) and wished to retaliate. He probably lost the war because of this, making the British bombing one of the most fortunate accidents in human history, I guess. The British quickly found that daylight bombing raids over Germany were essentially suicidal, however, and switched almost exclusively to night bombing of German cities - a tactic not known for its accuracy, given WW2 technology. They very rapidly became quite indiscriminate about civilian/military distinctions, "targeting" military sites only in a pro forma matter. The United States entered the war in force in 1942, as the 8th Air Force assembled in Britain. The 8th was explicitly a strategic bombardment force, meant to go after German targets in Germany itself, not the lines. The 9th Air Force, which was constructed later and eventually surpassed the 8th in side, was devoted to close air support, although as D-Day drew closer the 8th began to switch to that role as well. The United States had developed the somewhat legendary Norden bombsight and believed that the higher accuracy this granted its bombers would allow it to hit military targets in particular. Note that this is a _relative_ term - IIRC, the Circular Error Probable for bombs dropped from altitude using the Norden bombsight was _1 mile_. This, plus the larger industrial base of the United States and the traditional casualty insensitivity of the United States at war (American elites who believe that the American public will not tolerate casualties are, in my opinion, displaying little more than their lack of knowledge of both American military history and of _every_ public opinion poll ever taken on the subject) caused the 8th Air Force to decide to bomb during the day, accepting the extraordinary losses this would inflict upon the bombers in exchange for the greater accuracy this would grant the bombs. The phrase used by Spatz (I think) to justify this decision to his British counterparts was that between the RAF and the 8th, the German air defenses would be tired out by "bombing around the clock". By late 1942 the 8th was sending _1000_ plane raids over Germany. Goering reportedly said that the day he saw American bombers over Berlin in daylight, he knew that Germany had lost the war. The strategy was simple. By bombing Berlin, the 8th forced the Luftwaffe to defend in force. This meant that the 8th would take immense casualties among the bomber crews. The P-38s, P-47s, P-51s, and pressurized external fuel tanks that it had started to acquire, however, allowed it to run fighter escorts with the bombers. The combination of the casualties inflicted by those fighters, the bomber's gun crews, and the bomber attacks on air fields and factories themselves, was designed to shatter the Luftwaffe. In my opinion, the tactic was a success, but the price was astonishing, and it should give us all pause to think of the extraordinary courage and determination of both the crews who carried out the attacks and the Generals who consigned their men to the fire in such a way in the hope of winning the war. So, to get back to your question, the firebombings of Tokyo and Dresden were distinguished from the normal bombing raids largely by their effectiveness, not by their intent. Both American and British strategic bombing campaigns were conducted at high altitude, and involved thousands of planes flying over German cities and dropping lots and lots and lots of bombs. Even the American attacks, which were constructed with some care to target military targets (a product of technology and strategy, not virtue, I hasten to add) were doing so in a largely mythical fashion. When you drop a bomb on a factory in the middle of a city with a 50% chance that it will land _within 1 mile_ of your target, you're really not hitting the factory at all, are you? You're hitting the region of the city that happens to contain the factory, that's all. The British didn't even pretend, so far as I know. The strategic bombing campaigns were not necessarily a success. People _still_ argue about them, and the post-war Strategic Bombing Survey was harshly critical. But there wasn't really a whole lot of choice in the matter. The technology of the time meant that any sort of bombing campaign would _have to be_ fairly indiscriminate in terms of target. Today's technology is exactly the opposite - bombing civilian sites isn't just immoral it's (in warfare, often the same thing) inefficient, so doing it deliberately today under any but the most extraordinary circumstances really is just a sign of malice. Gautam
