Well i'm all for shrub being out. But I really like Tony Blair i dont know how the locals feel about him but i really think he's a good leader.
Of course i also like how british legislatures can basically call each other names and insult them while it sounds so nice. Kinda like the line from Reloaded its like wiping your ass with silk lol. "When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no skills. Sure, I was good with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a resume - it puts people off!" Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond" ----- Original Message ----- From: "Andre Turrettini" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:22 AM Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > I do find it fantastic that we havent found anything. > > We do have proof that in the past he used chemicals and nerve agents on the > curds repeatedly though. Theres enough pics of dead kurds for that to be > undeniable. Also, the iraqi national guardsmen were often found with > gasmasks. The trucks that Powell was likely talking about have been found. > > > So, IMHO, he did have them at some point. But were are they now? > > Again IMHO, I think that Saddam had enough time to realize he was doomed and > that he had one last opportunity to screw the US by taking away the whole > rationale. So, perhaps he did destroy it all. Or he may of moved it to > syria or such. It would have been easy enough. > > But unless we can prove that, I'll agree with the article that its a huge > mess and may very well cost some important people their jobs. > > DRE > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: William Wheatley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 9:04 AM > > To: CF-Community > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > So iraq used to be the major power in the middle east?? lol > > > > > > "When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no skills. > > Sure, I was good with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a > > resume - it puts people off!" Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond" > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Angel Stewart" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the > > situation that I > > > have read so far. It explains why the war was never about > > WMD (which > > > we all now know), the result of the war is the United States is now > > > the major power in the Middle East, and focussing on WMD instead of > > > the true strategy of the Bush Administration in this war > > was a grave > > > miscalculation: > > > ----- > > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > > > 5 June 2003 > > > > > > by Dr. George Friedman > > > > > > WMD > > > > > > Summary > > > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has > > > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain. Within > > > the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal political > > > infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in February > > that the > > > unwillingness of the U.S. government to articulate its > > real, strategic > > > reasons for the war -- choosing instead to lean on WMD as the > > > justification -- would lead to a deep crisis at some point. That > > > moment seems to be here. > > > > > > Analysis > > > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its > > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction of senior > > > British and American officials who used concerns about WMD > > in Iraq as > > > the primary, public justification for going to war. The > > simple fact is > > > that no one has found any weapons of mass destruction in > > Iraq and -- > > > except for some vans which may have been used for > > biological weapons > > > -- no evidence that Iraq was working to develop such weapons. Since > > > finding WMD is a priority for U.S. military forces, which have > > > occupied Iraq for more than a month, the failure to find weapons of > > > mass destruction not only has become an embarrassment, it > > also has the > > > potential to mushroom into a major political crisis in the United > > > States and Britain. Not only is the political opposition exploiting > > > the paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the various bureaucracies are > > using the > > > issue to try to discredit each other. It's a mess. > > > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled Smoke and > > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the > > > following points: > > > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was > > strategic and > > > not about weapons of mass destruction. > > > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily > > to justify > > > the attack to its coalition partners. > > > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for the > > > war would ultimately create massive confusion as to the > > nature of the > > > war the United States was fighting. > > > > > > As we put it: > > > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic > > interests as > > > the justification for war has created a crisis in U.S. strategy. > > > Deception campaigns are designed to protect strategies, not to trap > > > them. Ultimately, the foundation of U.S. grand strategy, coalitions > > > and the need for clarity in military strategy have collided. The > > > discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq will not solve the > > > problem, nor will a coup in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic > > > extremists] that will last for years, maintaining one's conceptual > > > footing is critical. If that footing cannot be maintained -- if the > > > requirements of the war and the requirements of strategic > > clarity are > > > incompatible -- there are more serious issues involved than > > the future > > > of Iraq." > > > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the invasion of > > > Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous justification--has > > now come home > > > to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, the inability to > > > locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of the > > United States > > > and is tearing the government apart in an orgy of finger-pointing. > > > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to > > start at the > > > beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al > > Qaeda was > > > regarded as an extraordinarily competent global organization. Sheer > > > logic argued that the network would want to top the Sept. > > 11 strikes > > > with something even more impressive. This led to a very reasonable > > > fear that al Qaeda possessed or was in the process of obtaining WMD. > > > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to > > hyper- sensitive > > > mode, began putting together bits of intelligence that > > tended to show > > > that what appeared to be logical actually was happening. The U.S. > > > intelligence apparatus now was operating in a worst-case scenario > > > mode, as is reasonable when dealing with WMD. Lower-grade > > intelligence > > > was regarded as significant. Two things > > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass destruction > > > expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al Qaeda's > > ability to > > > obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along with a range of less > > > public events -- was the "axis of evil" State of the Union speech, > > > which identified three countries as having WMD and likely > > to give it > > > to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of these countries. > > > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. > > policy, then it > > > is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used them in the past. It > > > was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq continued to > > possess WMD. > > > Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials believed there was a parallel > > > program in biological weapons, and also that Iraqi leaders had the > > > ability and the intent to restart their nuclear program, if > > they had > > > not already done so. Running on the worst-case basis that was now > > > hard-wired by al Qaeda into U.S. intelligence, Iraq was > > identified as > > > a country with WMD and likely to pass them on to al Qaeda. > > > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this class. There are > > > other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the "axis of evil" > > > countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the fundamental > > > problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has always argued, > > > the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and strategic purpose: > > > Psychologically, it was designed to demonstrate to the > > Islamic world > > > the enormous power and ferocity of the United States; > > strategically, > > > it was designed to position the United States to coerce > > countries such > > > as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran into changing their policies toward > > > suppressing al Qaeda operations in their countries. Both of these > > > missions were achieved. > > > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. > > It became, > > > however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political > > justification > > > for the war. It was understood that countries like France > > and Russia > > > had no interest in collaborating with Washington in a policy that > > > would make the United States the arbiter of the Middle East. > > > Washington had to find a justification for the war that > > these allies > > > would find irresistible. > > > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. > > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a > > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical weapons, and no > > > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally > > > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush > > > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it > > was assumed > > > that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's hands as > > > unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept the > > idea of a > > > war in which the stated goal -- and the real outcome -- > > would be the > > > destruction of Iraq's weapons. > > > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The public > > > justification for the war did not compel France, Germany or > > Russia to > > > endorse military action. They continued to resist because > > they fully > > > understood the outcome -- intended or not -- would be U.S. > > domination > > > of the Middle East, and they did not want to see that come about. > > > Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the WMD issue on its head, arguing > > > that if that was the real issue, then inspections by the United > > > Nations would be the way to solve the problem. Interestingly, they > > > never denied that Iraq had WMD; what they did deny was that > > proof of > > > WMD had been found. They also argued that over time, as proof > > > accumulated, the inspection process would either force the > > Iraqis to > > > destroy their WMD or justify an invasion at that point. What is > > > important here is that French and Russian leaders shared with the > > > United States the conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, > > > they thought weapons of mass destruction -- particularly if > > they were > > > primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue was U.S. > > > power in the Middle East. > > > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of assumptions. > > > There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime > > probably had WMD. > > > The issue between the United States and its allies was strategic. > > > After the war, the United States would become the dominant power in > > > the region, and it would use this power to force regional > > governments > > > to strike at al Qaeda. Germany, France and Russia, fearing > > the growth > > > of U.S. power, opposed the war. Rather than clarifying the chasm in > > > the alliance, the Bush administration permitted the arguments over > > > WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the American > > > public believing the administration's public statements -- smoke > > > and mirrors -- rather than its private view. > > > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- > > all assumed > > > that this problem would disappear when the U.S. military got into > > > Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public justification would be > > > vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved and no one > > would be the > > > wiser. What they did not count on -- what is difficult to > > believe even > > > now -- is that Hussein actually might not have WMD or, > > weirder still, > > > that he hid them or destroyed them so efficiently that no one could > > > find them. That was the kicker the Bush administration > > never counted > > > on. > > > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. Answers could > > > range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD, > > being held > > > in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point here is > > that the WMD > > > question was not the reason the United States went to war. > > The war was > > > waged in order to obtain a strategic base from which to coerce > > > countries such as Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia into using their > > > resources to destroy al Qaeda within their borders. From that > > > standpoint, the strategy seems to be working. > > > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the > > United States > > > walked into a trap. The question of the location of WMD is > > important. > > > The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense Department that > > > skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's WMD is also > > important. > > > But these questions are ultimately trivial compared to the use of > > > smoke and mirrors to justify a war in which Iraq was simply > > a single > > > campaign. Ultimately, the problem is that it created a situation in > > > which the American public had one perception of the reason > > for the war > > > while the war's planners had another. In a democratic > > society engaged > > > in a war that will last for many years, this is a dangerous > > situation > > > to have created. > > > ................................................................... > > > > > > ------ > > > > > > -Gel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Host with the leader in ColdFusion hosting. Voted #1 ColdFusion host by CF Developers. Offering shared and dedicated hosting options. www.cfxhosting.com/default.cfm?redirect=10481 Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
