hrm i said british not canadians :P No canadians thats righT! :)
"When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no skills. Sure, I was good with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a resume - it puts people off!" Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond" ----- Original Message ----- From: "Larry C. Lyons" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 12:14 PM Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > Aren't Parliamentary Rules great. If you ever get the change read the rules > set up by the House of Commons, (wheher Australian, British or Canadian). > They give a very detailed listing what the MP's cannot call each other, > includes both words and phrases. For instance one rule forbids members to > call another "Wherry faced ninnies" > > larry > > At 11:27 AM 6/6/2003 -0400, William Wheatley wrote: > >Well i'm all for shrub being out. But I really like Tony Blair i dont know > >how the locals feel about him but i really think he's a good leader. > > > > > >Of course i also like how british legislatures can basically call each other > >names and insult them while it sounds so nice. Kinda like the line from > >Reloaded its like wiping your ass with silk lol. > > > > > >"When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no skills. Sure, I was good > >with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a resume - it puts people off!" > >Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond" > >----- Original Message ----- > >From: "Andre Turrettini" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:22 AM > >Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > I do find it fantastic that we havent found anything. > > > > > > We do have proof that in the past he used chemicals and nerve agents on > >the > > > curds repeatedly though. Theres enough pics of dead kurds for that to be > > > undeniable. Also, the iraqi national guardsmen were often found with > > > gasmasks. The trucks that Powell was likely talking about have been > >found. > > > > > > > > > So, IMHO, he did have them at some point. But were are they now? > > > > > > Again IMHO, I think that Saddam had enough time to realize he was doomed > >and > > > that he had one last opportunity to screw the US by taking away the whole > > > rationale. So, perhaps he did destroy it all. Or he may of moved it to > > > syria or such. It would have been easy enough. > > > > > > But unless we can prove that, I'll agree with the article that its a huge > > > mess and may very well cost some important people their jobs. > > > > > > DRE > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: William Wheatley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 9:04 AM > > > > To: CF-Community > > > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > > > So iraq used to be the major power in the middle east?? lol > > > > > > > > > > > > "When I came back from Korea, I had no money, no skills. > > > > Sure, I was good with a bayonet, but you can't put that on a > > > > resume - it puts people off!" Frank Barone, "Everybody Loves Raymond" > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > > From: "Angel Stewart" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM > > > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the > > > > situation that I > > > > > have read so far. It explains why the war was never about > > > > WMD (which > > > > > we all now know), the result of the war is the United States is now > > > > > the major power in the Middle East, and focussing on WMD instead of > > > > > the true strategy of the Bush Administration in this war > > > > was a grave > > > > > miscalculation: > > > > > ----- > > > > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > > > > > 5 June 2003 > > > > > > > > > > by Dr. George Friedman > > > > > > > > > > WMD > > > > > > > > > > Summary > > > > > > > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has > > > > > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain. Within > > > > > the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal political > > > > > infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in February > > > > that the > > > > > unwillingness of the U.S. government to articulate its > > > > real, strategic > > > > > reasons for the war -- choosing instead to lean on WMD as the > > > > > justification -- would lead to a deep crisis at some point. That > > > > > moment seems to be here. > > > > > > > > > > Analysis > > > > > > > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its > > > > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction of senior > > > > > British and American officials who used concerns about WMD > > > > in Iraq as > > > > > the primary, public justification for going to war. The > > > > simple fact is > > > > > that no one has found any weapons of mass destruction in > > > > Iraq and -- > > > > > except for some vans which may have been used for > > > > biological weapons > > > > > -- no evidence that Iraq was working to develop such weapons. Since > > > > > finding WMD is a priority for U.S. military forces, which have > > > > > occupied Iraq for more than a month, the failure to find weapons of > > > > > mass destruction not only has become an embarrassment, it > > > > also has the > > > > > potential to mushroom into a major political crisis in the United > > > > > States and Britain. Not only is the political opposition exploiting > > > > > the paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the various bureaucracies are > > > > using the > > > > > issue to try to discredit each other. It's a mess. > > > > > > > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled Smoke and > > > > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the > > > > > following points: > > > > > > > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was > > > > strategic and > > > > > not about weapons of mass destruction. > > > > > > > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily > > > > to justify > > > > > the attack to its coalition partners. > > > > > > > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for the > > > > > war would ultimately create massive confusion as to the > > > > nature of the > > > > > war the United States was fighting. > > > > > > > > > > As we put it: > > > > > > > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic > > > > interests as > > > > > the justification for war has created a crisis in U.S. strategy. > > > > > Deception campaigns are designed to protect strategies, not to trap > > > > > them. Ultimately, the foundation of U.S. grand strategy, coalitions > > > > > and the need for clarity in military strategy have collided. The > > > > > discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq will not solve the > > > > > problem, nor will a coup in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic > > > > > extremists] that will last for years, maintaining one's conceptual > > > > > footing is critical. If that footing cannot be maintained -- if the > > > > > requirements of the war and the requirements of strategic > > > > clarity are > > > > > incompatible -- there are more serious issues involved than > > > > the future > > > > > of Iraq." > > > > > > > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the invasion of > > > > > Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous justification--has > > > > now come home > > > > > to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, the inability to > > > > > locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of the > > > > United States > > > > > and is tearing the government apart in an orgy of finger-pointing. > > > > > > > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to > > > > start at the > > > > > beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al > > > > Qaeda was > > > > > regarded as an extraordinarily competent global organization. Sheer > > > > > logic argued that the network would want to top the Sept. > > > > 11 strikes > > > > > with something even more impressive. This led to a very reasonable > > > > > fear that al Qaeda possessed or was in the process of obtaining WMD. > > > > > > > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to > > > > hyper- sensitive > > > > > mode, began putting together bits of intelligence that > > > > tended to show > > > > > that what appeared to be logical actually was happening. The U.S. > > > > > intelligence apparatus now was operating in a worst-case scenario > > > > > mode, as is reasonable when dealing with WMD. Lower-grade > > > > intelligence > > > > > was regarded as significant. Two things > > > > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass destruction > > > > > expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al Qaeda's > > > > ability to > > > > > obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along with a range of less > > > > > public events -- was the "axis of evil" State of the Union speech, > > > > > which identified three countries as having WMD and likely > > > > to give it > > > > > to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of these countries. > > > > > > > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. > > > > policy, then it > > > > > is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used them in the past. It > > > > > was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq continued to > > > > possess WMD. > > > > > Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials believed there was a parallel > > > > > program in biological weapons, and also that Iraqi leaders had the > > > > > ability and the intent to restart their nuclear program, if > > > > they had > > > > > not already done so. Running on the worst-case basis that was now > > > > > hard-wired by al Qaeda into U.S. intelligence, Iraq was > > > > identified as > > > > > a country with WMD and likely to pass them on to al Qaeda. > > > > > > > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this class. There are > > > > > other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the "axis of evil" > > > > > countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the fundamental > > > > > problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has always argued, > > > > > the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and strategic purpose: > > > > > Psychologically, it was designed to demonstrate to the > > > > Islamic world > > > > > the enormous power and ferocity of the United States; > > > > strategically, > > > > > it was designed to position the United States to coerce > > > > countries such > > > > > as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran into changing their policies toward > > > > > suppressing al Qaeda operations in their countries. Both of these > > > > > missions were achieved. > > > > > > > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. > > > > It became, > > > > > however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political > > > > justification > > > > > for the war. It was understood that countries like France > > > > and Russia > > > > > had no interest in collaborating with Washington in a policy that > > > > > would make the United States the arbiter of the Middle East. > > > > > Washington had to find a justification for the war that > > > > these allies > > > > > would find irresistible. > > > > > > > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. > > > > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a > > > > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical weapons, and no > > > > > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally > > > > > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush > > > > > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it > > > > was assumed > > > > > that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's hands as > > > > > unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept the > > > > idea of a > > > > > war in which the stated goal -- and the real outcome -- > > > > would be the > > > > > destruction of Iraq's weapons. > > > > > > > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The public > > > > > justification for the war did not compel France, Germany or > > > > Russia to > > > > > endorse military action. They continued to resist because > > > > they fully > > > > > understood the outcome -- intended or not -- would be U.S. > > > > domination > > > > > of the Middle East, and they did not want to see that come about. > > > > > Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the WMD issue on its head, arguing > > > > > that if that was the real issue, then inspections by the United > > > > > Nations would be the way to solve the problem. Interestingly, they > > > > > never denied that Iraq had WMD; what they did deny was that > > > > proof of > > > > > WMD had been found. They also argued that over time, as proof > > > > > accumulated, the inspection process would either force the > > > > Iraqis to > > > > > destroy their WMD or justify an invasion at that point. What is > > > > > important here is that French and Russian leaders shared with the > > > > > United States the conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, > > > > > they thought weapons of mass destruction -- particularly if > > > > they were > > > > > primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue was U.S. > > > > > power in the Middle East. > > > > > > > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of assumptions. > > > > > There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime > > > > probably had WMD. > > > > > The issue between the United States and its allies was strategic. > > > > > After the war, the United States would become the dominant power in > > > > > the region, and it would use this power to force regional > > > > governments > > > > > to strike at al Qaeda. Germany, France and Russia, fearing > > > > the growth > > > > > of U.S. power, opposed the war. Rather than clarifying the chasm in > > > > > the alliance, the Bush administration permitted the arguments over > > > > > WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the American > > > > > public believing the administration's public statements -- smoke > > > > > and mirrors -- rather than its private view. > > > > > > > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- > > > > all assumed > > > > > that this problem would disappear when the U.S. military got into > > > > > Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public justification would be > > > > > vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved and no one > > > > would be the > > > > > wiser. What they did not count on -- what is difficult to > > > > believe even > > > > > now -- is that Hussein actually might not have WMD or, > > > > weirder still, > > > > > that he hid them or destroyed them so efficiently that no one could > > > > > find them. That was the kicker the Bush administration > > > > never counted > > > > > on. > > > > > > > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. Answers could > > > > > range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD, > > > > being held > > > > > in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point here is > > > > that the WMD > > > > > question was not the reason the United States went to war. > > > > The war was > > > > > waged in order to obtain a strategic base from which to coerce > > > > > countries such as Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia into using their > > > > > resources to destroy al Qaeda within their borders. From that > > > > > standpoint, the strategy seems to be working. > > > > > > > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the > > > > United States > > > > > walked into a trap. The question of the location of WMD is > > > > important. > > > > > The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense Department that > > > > > skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's WMD is also > > > > important. > > > > > But these questions are ultimately trivial compared to the use of > > > > > smoke and mirrors to justify a war in which Iraq was simply > > > > a single > > > > > campaign. Ultimately, the problem is that it created a situation in > > > > > which the American public had one perception of the reason > > > > for the war > > > > > while the war's planners had another. In a democratic > > > > society engaged > > > > > in a war that will last for many years, this is a dangerous > > > > situation > > > > > to have created. > > > > > ................................................................... > > > > > > > > > > ------ > > > > > > > > > > -Gel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Host with the leader in ColdFusion hosting. Voted #1 ColdFusion host by CF Developers. Offering shared and dedicated hosting options. www.cfxhosting.com/default.cfm?redirect=10481 Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
