Prof. Maule writes: > Two things continue to puzzle me: > > 1. How is it that an individual is considered a member of one "people" > but not of another? Does not an individual, or group of individuals, > have the right to identify themselves as belonging to one or another > people? After all, what does it mean to be "French"? Is a person of > Basque descent or a Breton compelled to "be French"? Why are the > remnants of imperial or Napoleonic military might the dictates of a > person's peopleness? > > 2. Why is it that individuals living in Yugoslavia were "permitted" > (encouraged?) to split into precedent "peoples" that form nations > whereas those living in Iraq are being told they cannot do so and must > remain one "people" on account of boundaries drawn by colonial powers? > > There's deep inconsistency here.
Comment: I am no expert on the right to self-determination under international law, but let me try to answer some of your questions in relation to the Constitution's "We the people." I do not believe that there is any international law that says you cannot belong to two or more different peoples. Yugoslavia was a federation of republics generally divided along national lines. Therefore, those republics could declare themselves independent states, as Slovenia did by plebiscite. When a region or republic was nationally mixed (e.g., Kosovo, B-H), conflict often occurred and resolution was accomplished by treaty (e.g., Dayton Agreement) because treaties are the appropriate legal instrument for making agreements between nations (i.e., peoples). There is no international law that says the peoples of Iraq cannot establish their own states. (By the way, a nation (i.e., people) is different from a state under international law.) International law usually requires that such states be recognized as such by other states. The U.S. or other foreign states cannot split Iraq up along national lines, according to international law. Only the peoples of Iraq can do that. When the Constitution says that the people of the United States establish the Constitution, this is entirely consistent with pre-19th century international law because according to Burlamaqui (often cited by the Framers), "sovereignty resides originally in the people," under the law of nations. The people of the individual thirteen states self-identified themselves collectively as the American people. However, the American people also self-identified themselves as, e.g., Virginians, etc. Therefore, the states could remain intact as such under the law of nations. Because of the conflicts between the thirteen states under the Articles of Confederation, resolution was accomplished by making a new treaty -- the Constitution. Like the earlier Treaty of Union (1707) that unified the Scottish and English states and consolidated the British people, the Constitution created a more perfect union between the thirteen states and consolidated the American people -- a comparative similarity that Jay made in the Federalist No. 5. Francisco Forrest Martin
