I confess to have given little thought to standing in establishment clause cases, except to wonder a bit about the vitality of Flast. Is it really true that if Flast were overruled, there would be no standing in the cases John Eastman lists? Surely the ACLU could find individual members who suffer injury in fact from regularly walking into the courthouse or driving past the town hall and seeing a cr�che or a ten commandments monument that offends them.
I understand that if Newdow does not have custody of his daughter then he has less of a legal right to control his daughter's education. But is he really uninjured in the standing sense, with the result that he must rely on Flast? Whether or not he has suffered a legal wrong, he credibly can claim an injury as a parent. Or am I taking the injury idea too far? This seems as concrete to me as the injuries that sufficed in Laidlaw. John T. Parry Associate Professor of Law University of Pittsburgh School of Law 3900 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15260 412-648-7006 -----Original Message----- From: Discussion list for con law professors [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Eastman, John Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2003 12:58 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Standing Issue in Pledge of Allegiance Case I'm puzzled by Earl's statement that Flast is limited to the federal exercise of the spending power. Everson involved a state taxpayer challenging state funding; most of the various creche cases, such as Allegheny County v ACLU and Lynch v. Donnelly, have involved taxpayer (or merely citizen) challenges to state action, as does the recent ACLU case down in Alabama against Roy Moore on the Ten Commandments monument. Forgive me if I'm missing something. John C. Eastman Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence -----Original Message----- From: Earl Maltz [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2003 8:37 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Standing Issue in Pledge of Allegiance Case Flast v. Cohen is limited to challenges to federal exercise of the spending power and has been narrowly limited to that context. Nednow's only claim would be that his right of parental control of his daughter's religion is being undermined. The Court may have an issue with such an injury being asserted by a noncustodial parent (I think that is Nednow's relationship). At 08:19 AM 10/16/2003 -0700, you wrote: >Am I missing something on the standing question, or is this squarely >governed by Flast v. Cohen's acceptance of taxpayer standing in >Establishment Clause cases whether or not Newdow's relationship with >his daughter would provide grounds for the more particularized harm >required outside of the EC context? > > >John C. Eastman >Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law >Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional >Jurisprudence -----Original Message----- >From: Conkle, Daniel O. [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2003 7:06 AM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Standing Issue in Pledge of Allegiance Case > >I haven't studied or taught standing doctrine in any detail for a long >time. I'd be very interested in knowing what those of you who know >more than I do might think about the standing question and how the S. >Ct. might resolve it. > >Dan Conkle >************************************** >Daniel O. Conkle >Professor of Law >Indiana University School of Law >Bloomington, Indiana 47405 >(812) 855-4331 >fax (812) 855-0555 >e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] >************************************** > >-----Original Message----- >From: Sam Bagenstos [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 3:29 PM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: Justices Take Case on Pledge of Allegiance's 'God' >Reference > >The only thing I'd say about this is that I wouldn't count any of the >"Fab Four" as sure votes for the plaintiff on the standing question.
