If this is the theory, how is it limited to only the father? Why can't any atheist then say that he's denigrated by the government embracing an idea he doesn't believe in?
And how does this theory that fit with Allen v. Wright? It wasn't a good enough injury for black parents to feel denigrated by the IRS allowing racially discriminatory private schools to have tax exemptions. Why is the Establishment Clause different from Equal Protection outside of the special (grandfathered in?) Flast situation? I don't see how this idea that other people (even your children) are going to think less of you because you believe something different from the government constitutes a distinct and palpable injury for standing purposes. Could a person who is opposed to a war challenge its constitutionality on the theory that he's injured by his own objection to it and how that makes him look to other people? Ann "Steve Gey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I'm not sure why Flast has crept into the discussion of Newdow. Newdow is not > a Flast case. Newdow didn't litigate it as a Flast case and the Ninth Circuit > didn't decide it as a Flast case. Moreover, Newdow is not in court on behalf > of his daughter, so it's not clear to me why the issue of custody is relevant. > (Although it should be noted that in a letter sent to the Court in conjunction > with his cert. petition, Newdow notes that he has now been granted joint > custody.) Newdow is representing himself to prevent the state from endorsing > religion in a public school attended by his daughter, with whom he has a > significant ongoing parental relationship (even if a noncustodial one). > Newdow's injury is that the state is engaged in unconstitutional behavior that > will affect his daughter's perception of and relationship with him. This is > the standing claim the Ninth Circuit accepted in its December 4 standing > decision. This is what the court said: "While Newdow cannot expect! > the entire community surrounding his daughter to participate in, let alone > agree with, his choice of atheism and his daughter's exposure to his views, he > can expect to be free from the government's endorsing a particular view of > religion and unconstitutionally indoctrinating his impressionable young > daughter on a daily basis in that official view. The pledge to a nation > 'under God,' with its imprimatur of governmental sanction, provides the > message to Newdow's young daughter not only that non-believers, or believers > in non-Judeo-Christian religions, are outsiders, but more specifically that > her father's beliefs are those of an outsider, and necessarily inferior to > what she is exposed to in the classroom." I really don't see why this is a > controversial theory. Change the Newdow facts slightly: Suppose Newdow is an > orthodox Jew rather than an atheist and suppose also that the religious > expression in issue involves daily statements by his daughter's public school > teacher ! > to the effect that Jews are evil Christ-killers and are all going to h > e > have standing to challenge the teacher's actions? > > With regard to John Eastman's post, the recent Judge Moore/Ten Commandments > case was also not a Flast case. The three plaintiffs in that case based their > claim on personal exposure to the monument, not their taxpayer status. This > is the district court's description of their claim: "All three plaintiffs are > attorneys who regularly practice law in Alabama's courts. Each has testified > that he or she has come into direct contact with the monument on multiple > occasions, and each expects to do so in the future as a result of his or her > professional obligations. Each finds the monument offensive, and each has > said the monument makes him or her feel like an 'outsider.' Furthermore, two > plaintiffs, Howard and Maddox, have changed their behavior as a result of the > monument: each visits the rotunda less frequently and enjoys the rotunda less > because of the monument's presence. The monument has, therefore, had a direct > negative effect on each plaintiff's 'use and enjoyment' of the! > rotunda." John Parry is therefore correct in noting that there is a more > direct method than Flast to achieve standing in symbolic endorsement cases. > An earlier case against Judge Moore's previous version of the Ten Commandments > (a wooden plaque that he nailed to the wall behind the bench in his courtroom > when he was a trial judge) was indeed brought on Flast grounds, and was > dismissed because no state money had been used to purchase or maintain the > plaque. > > Steve Gey > Florida State University > College of Law
