On Flast, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
In both Allegheny County and Lynch v. Donnelly, the plaintiffs had to see the challenged material, thus they suffered an aesthetic injury a la the plaintiffs in United States v. Scrap.
I have no idea why the plaintffs had Article III standing in Everson. It started as a taxpayer suit in state court, where the federal standing rules don't apply and no one (including the justices) seemed to notice the Article III standing issue on appeal.
At 09:57 AM 10/16/2003 -0700, you wrote:
I'm puzzled by Earl's statement that Flast is limited to the federal exercise of the spending power. Everson involved a state taxpayer challenging state funding; most of the various creche cases, such as Allegheny County v ACLU and Lynch v. Donnelly, have involved taxpayer (or merely citizen) challenges to state action, as does the recent ACLU case down in Alabama against Roy Moore on the Ten Commandments monument.
Forgive me if I'm missing something.
John C. Eastman Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
-----Original Message----- From: Earl Maltz [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2003 8:37 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Standing Issue in Pledge of Allegiance Case
Flast v. Cohen is limited to challenges to federal exercise of the spending power and has been narrowly limited to that context. Nednow's only claim would be that his right of parental control of his daughter's religion is being undermined. The Court may have an issue with such an injury being asserted by a noncustodial parent (I think that is Nednow's relationship).
At 08:19 AM 10/16/2003 -0700, you wrote: >Am I missing something on the standing question, or is this squarely >governed by Flast v. Cohen's acceptance of taxpayer standing in >Establishment Clause cases whether or not Newdow's relationship with >his daughter would provide grounds for the more particularized harm >required outside of the EC context? > > >John C. Eastman >Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law >Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional >Jurisprudence -----Original Message----- >From: Conkle, Daniel O. [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2003 7:06 AM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Standing Issue in Pledge of Allegiance Case > >I haven't studied or taught standing doctrine in any detail for a long >time. I'd be very interested in knowing what those of you who know >more than I do might think about the standing question and how the S. >Ct. might resolve it. > >Dan Conkle >************************************** >Daniel O. Conkle >Professor of Law >Indiana University School of Law >Bloomington, Indiana 47405 >(812) 855-4331 >fax (812) 855-0555 >e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] >************************************** > >-----Original Message----- >From: Sam Bagenstos [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 3:29 PM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: Justices Take Case on Pledge of Allegiance's 'God' >Reference > >The only thing I'd say about this is that I wouldn't count any of the >"Fab Four" as sure votes for the plaintiff on the standing question.
