First of all, I think systems that make people associate arbitrary long strings with someone's email address aren't really acceptable. I'll repeat that my model is "give someone your email address on a napkin in a bar". I do things like this often enough right now.
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 06:41:27 -0400 Jerry Leichter <leich...@lrw.com> wrote: > On the underlying matter of changing my public key: *Why* would I > have to change it? Because people make mistakes and reveal security critical information to the world at intervals. Because computers are sometimes compromised. A system that does not permit you to recover from rare events is not going to deploy very well. I think that to begin with, though, a system that requires people to somehow associate arbitrary strings with their friends won't work either. Anyway, I proposed a system to handle id to key mappings with reasonable trust in the first of my three messages on my proposed new model -- it also happens to handle revocation reasonably well (though imperfectly). Perry -- Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
