As Gerv suggested this was the official call for incidents with respect to 
StartCom, it seems appropriate to start a new thread.

It would seem that, in evaluating the relationship with WoSign and Qihoo, we 
naturally reach three possible conclusions:
1) StartCom is treated as an independent entity
2) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of Qihoo
3) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of WoSign

We know there are serious incidents with WoSign that, collectively, encourage 
the community to distrust future certificates. However, there hasn't been a 
similar investigation into the trustworthiness of StartCom as an independent 
entity or as an entity operated by Qihoo. It would seem that germane to the 
discussion is how trustworthy the claims are - from either StartCom or Qihoo - 
and how that affects trust.

Incidents with StartCom:
A) Duplicate Serials.
We know that StartCom had issues issuing duplicate serials, in violation of RFC 
5280. We know that they did not prioritize resolution, and when attempting 
resolution, did so incompletely, as the issue still resurfaced.

C) Improper OCSP responder. /
We know that StartCom continues to have issue with their OCSP responder after 
they issue certificates. Presumably, this is a CDN distribution delay, but we 
can't be sure, especially considering Incident A was with the underlying 
systems. As a consequence of this, users with StartCom certificates are 
disproportionately disadvantaged from enabling OCSP stapling, which many 
browser programs support (and is perhaps the only viable path towards a 
complete revocation solution).

E) Heartbleed. /
We know StartCom had a notoriously poor response to HeartBleed. Eddy first 
dismissed the significance, and then when proven wrong, still continued to 
charge $25 USD for revocation. Ostensibly, this is a violation of the Baseline 
Requirements, in that CAs are required to revoke certificates suspected of Key 
Compromise. However, despite the BRs effective date of 2012, Mozilla was not 
aggressively imposing compliance then (... or now, to be fair).

G) StartCom BR violations - IV
StartCom was materially violating its CP/CPS and the Baseline Requirements with 
respect to certain types of validation. No explanation for the root cause 

I) StartCom BR violations (2) - Key Sizes
StartCom was issuing certificates less than 2048 bits.

K) StartCom impersonating
StartCom's (former) CEO Eddy Nigg obtained a key and certificate for and placed it on an Internet-facing server.

M) StartCom BR violations (3) - Key exponents
StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to RSA public exponents.

O) StartCom BR violations (4) - Curve violations
StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to EC curve algorithms.

In addition to discussion of StartCom issues, it seems relevant to future trust 
to evaluate issues with Qihoo. Many in the Mozilla community may not have 
direct interactions with Qihoo, but they have obtained some notoriety in 
security circles.

Q.A) Qihoo masking their browser as a critical Windows security update to IE 
users. /
Qihoo displayed a misleading security update for Windows users that instead 
installed their browser.

Q.C) Qihoo browser actively enables insecure cryptography.
Qihoo's browser is notably insecure with respect to SSL/TLS, with some of the 
insecure changes requiring active modification to the low-level source 
libraries that Chromium (of which they're based on) uses.

Q.E) Qihoo apps removed from app stores due to malware /
Qihoo Apps have repeatedly been banned from Apple's App Store due to issues

Q.G) Qihoo "security" apps repeatedly found as unfair competition

I hope the above show that the odds are if the original StartCom systems are 
restored, we're likely to continue to have significant BR violations - a 
pattern StartCom has repeatedly demonstrated over several years. Similarly, if 
we were to accept trust in Qihoo, then we would be ignoring the precedent Qihoo 
has set of choosing insecure and anti-user behaviours masked as "security".
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