Yuwei, 
I don’t know who you are, but I can tell you and the community, Qihoo 360 never 
been involved in ***** Fire Wall project, if you did some investigation to the 
message that accused Qihoo 360 joined the project “Search Engine Content 
Security Management System”, you should know the project had been done on Feb 
2005, before Qihoo 360 was founded on Aug 2005, and the project is neither part 
of the ***** fire wall project nor a project done by Qihoo 360, actually it is 
part of the efforts to help Yahoo’s search engine could work in China, I was 
the tech head of Yahoo!China ‘s tech team, director of engineering and soon the 
CTO of Yahoo!China, I know what happened at that time.
 
Thanks,
Xiaosheng Tan



在 2016/10/13 上午5:22,“dev-security-policy 代表 Han 
Yuwei”<dev-security-policy-bounces+tanxiaosheng=360...@lists.mozilla.org 代表 
hanyuwe...@gmail.com> 写入:

    在 2016年10月13日星期四 UTC+8上午3:12:08,Ryan Sleevi写道:
    > As Gerv suggested this was the official call for incidents with respect 
to StartCom, it seems appropriate to start a new thread.
    > 
    > It would seem that, in evaluating the relationship with WoSign and Qihoo, 
we naturally reach three possible conclusions:
    > 1) StartCom is treated as an independent entity
    > 2) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of Qihoo
    > 3) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of WoSign
    > 
    > We know there are serious incidents with WoSign that, collectively, 
encourage the community to distrust future certificates. However, there hasn't 
been a similar investigation into the trustworthiness of StartCom as an 
independent entity or as an entity operated by Qihoo. It would seem that 
germane to the discussion is how trustworthy the claims are - from either 
StartCom or Qihoo - and how that affects trust.
    > 
    > Incidents with StartCom:
    > A) Duplicate Serials. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1029884
    > We know that StartCom had issues issuing duplicate serials, in violation 
of RFC 5280. We know that they did not prioritize resolution, and when 
attempting resolution, did so incompletely, as the issue still resurfaced.
    > 
    > C) Improper OCSP responder. 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1006479 / 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1151270
    > We know that StartCom continues to have issue with their OCSP responder 
after they issue certificates. Presumably, this is a CDN distribution delay, 
but we can't be sure, especially considering Incident A was with the underlying 
systems. As a consequence of this, users with StartCom certificates are 
disproportionately disadvantaged from enabling OCSP stapling, which many 
browser programs support (and is perhaps the only viable path towards a 
complete revocation solution).
    > 
    > E) Heartbleed. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994033 / 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994478
    > We know StartCom had a notoriously poor response to HeartBleed. Eddy 
first dismissed the significance, and then when proven wrong, still continued 
to charge $25 USD for revocation. Ostensibly, this is a violation of the 
Baseline Requirements, in that CAs are required to revoke certificates 
suspected of Key Compromise. However, despite the BRs effective date of 2012, 
Mozilla was not aggressively imposing compliance then (... or now, to be fair).
    > 
    > G) StartCom BR violations - IV 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1266942
    > StartCom was materially violating its CP/CPS and the Baseline 
Requirements with respect to certain types of validation. No explanation for 
the root cause provided.
    > 
    > I) StartCom BR violations (2) - Key Sizes 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1015767
    > StartCom was issuing certificates less than 2048 bits.
    > 
    > K) StartCom impersonating mozilla.com. 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=471702
    > StartCom's (former) CEO Eddy Nigg obtained a key and certificate for 
www.mozilla.com and placed it on an Internet-facing server.
    > 
    > M) StartCom BR violations (3) - Key exponents 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1212655
    > StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to RSA public exponents.
    > 
    > O) StartCom BR violations (4) - Curve violations 
https://bug98304.bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1269183
    > StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to EC curve algorithms.
    > 
    > 
    > 
    > In addition to discussion of StartCom issues, it seems relevant to future 
trust to evaluate issues with Qihoo. Many in the Mozilla community may not have 
direct interactions with Qihoo, but they have obtained some notoriety in 
security circles.
    > 
    > Q.A) Qihoo masking their browser as a critical Windows security update to 
IE users.
    > http://wmos.info/archives/7717 / 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/02/01/qihoo_government_warning_fraud/
    > Qihoo displayed a misleading security update for Windows users that 
instead installed their browser.
    > 
    > Q.C) Qihoo browser actively enables insecure cryptography.
    > 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7lenmn5XO06QohaJzVffnJxjXjY1rD70wg34gfuxRo/edit
    > Qihoo's browser is notably insecure with respect to SSL/TLS, with some of 
the insecure changes requiring active modification to the low-level source 
libraries that Chromium (of which they're based on) uses.
    > 
    > Q.E) Qihoo apps removed from app stores due to malware
    > 
https://www.techinasia.com/qihoo-committing-fraud-google-making-huge-mistake / 
https://www.techinasia.com/qihoo-apps-banned-apple-app-store
    > Qihoo Apps have repeatedly been banned from Apple's App Store due to 
issues
    > 
    > Q.G) Qihoo "security" apps repeatedly found as unfair competition
    > 
https://www.techinasia.com/qihoo-360-loses-chinas-courts-ordered-pay-sogou-82-million-unfair-competition
    > 
    > 
    > 
    > I hope the above show that the odds are if the original StartCom systems 
are restored, we're likely to continue to have significant BR violations - a 
pattern StartCom has repeatedly demonstrated over several years. Similarly, if 
we were to accept trust in Qihoo, then we would be ignoring the precedent Qihoo 
has set of choosing insecure and anti-user behaviours masked as "security".
    
    As a Chinese Internet user, I would say that Qihoo has a very negative 
reputation on China online community for its precedent's malware(maybe not 
accurate) and some awful actions such as "3Q Battle", installing software 
sliently, misleading ads, suspiciously collecting data which is believed 
helping govnerment monitoring citizens and so on. But on the other hand, their 
product, "360安全卫士" (360 Total Security)(two names are not the same version but 
I can't find another english name),as I thought, has improved the total 
security level of China Internet. And it has changed the ecosystem of Chinese 
anti-malware software,which I don't know it is good or bad. And it's believed 
that Qihoo have a tight connection with the Great Fire Wall project.
    
    Since "The Big Brother is Watching you" is not accepted in Mozilla, I 
thought Qihoo is not trustworthy in operating a CA.
    
    P.S. Anyone who knows to change the font size of google group? As a 
non-english native speaker it is hard for me to read such a small size in the 
content.
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