The information on Baidu Baike is not correct, I tried to correct it, but
failed, I don’t know why.
I’m the Vice President of Qihoo 360 from end of 2009, installed as Chief
Privacy Officer from 15th March 2012 as well, titled as Chief Security Officer
of Qihoo 360 from Feb 2016, I never been the CTO of Qihoo 360.
I’m the school mate of Mr.Hongyi Zhou, same grade, but not in the same class,
both in Computer Science and Engineering Dept of Xi’an Jiaotong University from
1988 to 1992, I worked for Mr.Zhou from 2003 to 2005, then 2009 till now.
I’m here on behalf of myself, and answer some question about Qihoo 360 under
the authority of my responsibility: Chief Security Officer, I should take care
of the information security related issues.
Is there anybody think any information in the cyber space is truth? It is funny.
在 2016/10/13 下午4:22，“dev-security-policy 代表
Mr. Xiaosheng Tan
According to the page of your personal details
(http://baike.baidu.com/view/4571996.htm) in Baidu BaiKe. Currently you are the
CTO and VP of Qihuoo. And you have a long recorder working and even studying
with Hongyi Zhou, the CEO and the owner of Qihoo who was entitled as "the
father of Chinese malware" by netizen.
So, do you represent your company to explain the issues? or Hongyi Zhou? or
On Thursday, October 13, 2016 at 10:58:34 AM UTC+8, 谭晓生 wrote:
> I don’t know who you are, but I can tell you and the community, Qihoo 360
never been involved in ***** Fire Wall project, if you did some investigation
to the message that accused Qihoo 360 joined the project “Search Engine Content
Security Management System”, you should know the project had been done on Feb
2005, before Qihoo 360 was founded on Aug 2005, and the project is neither part
of the ***** fire wall project nor a project done by Qihoo 360, actually it is
part of the efforts to help Yahoo’s search engine could work in China, I was
the tech head of Yahoo!China ‘s tech team, director of engineering and soon the
CTO of Yahoo!China, I know what happened at that time.
> Xiaosheng Tan
> 在 2016/10/13 上午5:22，“dev-security-policy 代表 Han
> 在 2016年10月13日星期四 UTC+8上午3:12:08，Ryan Sleevi写道：
> > As Gerv suggested this was the official call for incidents with
respect to StartCom, it seems appropriate to start a new thread.
> > It would seem that, in evaluating the relationship with WoSign and
Qihoo, we naturally reach three possible conclusions:
> > 1) StartCom is treated as an independent entity
> > 2) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of Qihoo
> > 3) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of WoSign
> > We know there are serious incidents with WoSign that, collectively,
encourage the community to distrust future certificates. However, there hasn't
been a similar investigation into the trustworthiness of StartCom as an
independent entity or as an entity operated by Qihoo. It would seem that
germane to the discussion is how trustworthy the claims are - from either
StartCom or Qihoo - and how that affects trust.
> > Incidents with StartCom:
> > A) Duplicate Serials.
> > We know that StartCom had issues issuing duplicate serials, in
violation of RFC 5280. We know that they did not prioritize resolution, and
when attempting resolution, did so incompletely, as the issue still resurfaced.
> > C) Improper OCSP responder.
> > We know that StartCom continues to have issue with their OCSP
responder after they issue certificates. Presumably, this is a CDN distribution
delay, but we can't be sure, especially considering Incident A was with the
underlying systems. As a consequence of this, users with StartCom certificates
are disproportionately disadvantaged from enabling OCSP stapling, which many
browser programs support (and is perhaps the only viable path towards a
complete revocation solution).
> > E) Heartbleed. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994033
> > We know StartCom had a notoriously poor response to HeartBleed.
Eddy first dismissed the significance, and then when proven wrong, still
continued to charge $25 USD for revocation. Ostensibly, this is a violation of
the Baseline Requirements, in that CAs are required to revoke certificates
suspected of Key Compromise. However, despite the BRs effective date of 2012,
Mozilla was not aggressively imposing compliance then (... or now, to be fair).
> > G) StartCom BR violations - IV
> > StartCom was materially violating its CP/CPS and the Baseline
Requirements with respect to certain types of validation. No explanation for
the root cause provided.
> > I) StartCom BR violations (2) - Key Sizes
> > StartCom was issuing certificates less than 2048 bits.
> > K) StartCom impersonating mozilla.com.
> > StartCom's (former) CEO Eddy Nigg obtained a key and certificate
for www.mozilla.com and placed it on an Internet-facing server.
> > M) StartCom BR violations (3) - Key exponents
> > StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to RSA public
> > O) StartCom BR violations (4) - Curve violations
> > StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to EC curve
> > In addition to discussion of StartCom issues, it seems relevant to
future trust to evaluate issues with Qihoo. Many in the Mozilla community may
not have direct interactions with Qihoo, but they have obtained some notoriety
in security circles.
> > Q.A) Qihoo masking their browser as a critical Windows security
update to IE users.
> > http://wmos.info/archives/7717 /
> > Qihoo displayed a misleading security update for Windows users that
instead installed their browser.
> > Q.C) Qihoo browser actively enables insecure cryptography.
> > Qihoo's browser is notably insecure with respect to SSL/TLS, with
some of the insecure changes requiring active modification to the low-level
source libraries that Chromium (of which they're based on) uses.
> > Q.E) Qihoo apps removed from app stores due to malware
> > Qihoo Apps have repeatedly been banned from Apple's App Store due
> > Q.G) Qihoo "security" apps repeatedly found as unfair competition
> > I hope the above show that the odds are if the original StartCom
systems are restored, we're likely to continue to have significant BR
violations - a pattern StartCom has repeatedly demonstrated over several years.
Similarly, if we were to accept trust in Qihoo, then we would be ignoring the
precedent Qihoo has set of choosing insecure and anti-user behaviours masked as
> As a Chinese Internet user, I would say that Qihoo has a very
negative reputation on China online community for its precedent's malware(maybe
not accurate) and some awful actions such as "3Q Battle", installing software
sliently, misleading ads, suspiciously collecting data which is believed
helping govnerment monitoring citizens and so on. But on the other hand, their
product, "360安全卫士" (360 Total Security)(two names are not the same version but
I can't find another english name),as I thought, has improved the total
security level of China Internet. And it has changed the ecosystem of Chinese
anti-malware software,which I don't know it is good or bad. And it's believed
that Qihoo have a tight connection with the Great Fire Wall project.
> Since "The Big Brother is Watching you" is not accepted in Mozilla, I
thought Qihoo is not trustworthy in operating a CA.
> P.S. Anyone who knows to change the font size of google group? As a
non-english native speaker it is hard for me to read such a small size in the
> dev-security-policy mailing list
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