The information on Baidu Baike is not correct, I tried to correct it, but failed, I don’t know why. I’m the Vice President of Qihoo 360 from end of 2009, installed as Chief Privacy Officer from 15th March 2012 as well, titled as Chief Security Officer of Qihoo 360 from Feb 2016, I never been the CTO of Qihoo 360. I’m the school mate of Mr.Hongyi Zhou, same grade, but not in the same class, both in Computer Science and Engineering Dept of Xi’an Jiaotong University from 1988 to 1992, I worked for Mr.Zhou from 2003 to 2005, then 2009 till now. I’m here on behalf of myself, and answer some question about Qihoo 360 under the authority of my responsibility: Chief Security Officer, I should take care of the information security related issues. Is there anybody think any information in the cyber space is truth? It is funny.
Thanks， Xiaosheng Tan 在 2016/10/13 下午4:22，“dev-security-policy 代表 solar”<dev-security-policy-bounces+tanxiaosheng=360...@lists.mozilla.org 代表 sofl...@gmail.com> 写入: Mr. Xiaosheng Tan According to the page of your personal details (http://baike.baidu.com/view/4571996.htm) in Baidu BaiKe. Currently you are the CTO and VP of Qihuoo. And you have a long recorder working and even studying with Hongyi Zhou, the CEO and the owner of Qihoo who was entitled as "the father of Chinese malware" by netizen. So, do you represent your company to explain the issues? or Hongyi Zhou? or only yourself? On Thursday, October 13, 2016 at 10:58:34 AM UTC+8, 谭晓生 wrote: > Yuwei, > I don’t know who you are, but I can tell you and the community, Qihoo 360 never been involved in ***** Fire Wall project, if you did some investigation to the message that accused Qihoo 360 joined the project “Search Engine Content Security Management System”, you should know the project had been done on Feb 2005, before Qihoo 360 was founded on Aug 2005, and the project is neither part of the ***** fire wall project nor a project done by Qihoo 360, actually it is part of the efforts to help Yahoo’s search engine could work in China, I was the tech head of Yahoo!China ‘s tech team, director of engineering and soon the CTO of Yahoo!China, I know what happened at that time. > > Thanks， > Xiaosheng Tan > > > > 在 2016/10/13 上午5:22，“dev-security-policy 代表 Han Yuwei”<dev-security-policy-bounces+tanxiaosheng=360...@lists.mozilla.org 代表 hanyuwe...@gmail.com> 写入: > > 在 2016年10月13日星期四 UTC+8上午3:12:08，Ryan Sleevi写道： > > As Gerv suggested this was the official call for incidents with respect to StartCom, it seems appropriate to start a new thread. > > > > It would seem that, in evaluating the relationship with WoSign and Qihoo, we naturally reach three possible conclusions: > > 1) StartCom is treated as an independent entity > > 2) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of Qihoo > > 3) StartCom is treated as a subsidiary of WoSign > > > > We know there are serious incidents with WoSign that, collectively, encourage the community to distrust future certificates. However, there hasn't been a similar investigation into the trustworthiness of StartCom as an independent entity or as an entity operated by Qihoo. It would seem that germane to the discussion is how trustworthy the claims are - from either StartCom or Qihoo - and how that affects trust. > > > > Incidents with StartCom: > > A) Duplicate Serials. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1029884 > > We know that StartCom had issues issuing duplicate serials, in violation of RFC 5280. We know that they did not prioritize resolution, and when attempting resolution, did so incompletely, as the issue still resurfaced. > > > > C) Improper OCSP responder. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1006479 / https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1151270 > > We know that StartCom continues to have issue with their OCSP responder after they issue certificates. Presumably, this is a CDN distribution delay, but we can't be sure, especially considering Incident A was with the underlying systems. As a consequence of this, users with StartCom certificates are disproportionately disadvantaged from enabling OCSP stapling, which many browser programs support (and is perhaps the only viable path towards a complete revocation solution). > > > > E) Heartbleed. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994033 / https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994478 > > We know StartCom had a notoriously poor response to HeartBleed. Eddy first dismissed the significance, and then when proven wrong, still continued to charge $25 USD for revocation. Ostensibly, this is a violation of the Baseline Requirements, in that CAs are required to revoke certificates suspected of Key Compromise. However, despite the BRs effective date of 2012, Mozilla was not aggressively imposing compliance then (... or now, to be fair). > > > > G) StartCom BR violations - IV https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1266942 > > StartCom was materially violating its CP/CPS and the Baseline Requirements with respect to certain types of validation. No explanation for the root cause provided. > > > > I) StartCom BR violations (2) - Key Sizes https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1015767 > > StartCom was issuing certificates less than 2048 bits. > > > > K) StartCom impersonating mozilla.com. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=471702 > > StartCom's (former) CEO Eddy Nigg obtained a key and certificate for www.mozilla.com and placed it on an Internet-facing server. > > > > M) StartCom BR violations (3) - Key exponents https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1212655 > > StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to RSA public exponents. > > > > O) StartCom BR violations (4) - Curve violations https://bug98304.bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1269183 > > StartCom was not enforcing the BRs with respect to EC curve algorithms. > > > > > > > > In addition to discussion of StartCom issues, it seems relevant to future trust to evaluate issues with Qihoo. Many in the Mozilla community may not have direct interactions with Qihoo, but they have obtained some notoriety in security circles. > > > > Q.A) Qihoo masking their browser as a critical Windows security update to IE users. > > http://wmos.info/archives/7717 / http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/02/01/qihoo_government_warning_fraud/ > > Qihoo displayed a misleading security update for Windows users that instead installed their browser. > > > > Q.C) Qihoo browser actively enables insecure cryptography. > > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7lenmn5XO06QohaJzVffnJxjXjY1rD70wg34gfuxRo/edit > > Qihoo's browser is notably insecure with respect to SSL/TLS, with some of the insecure changes requiring active modification to the low-level source libraries that Chromium (of which they're based on) uses. > > > > Q.E) Qihoo apps removed from app stores due to malware > > https://www.techinasia.com/qihoo-committing-fraud-google-making-huge-mistake / https://www.techinasia.com/qihoo-apps-banned-apple-app-store > > Qihoo Apps have repeatedly been banned from Apple's App Store due to issues > > > > Q.G) Qihoo "security" apps repeatedly found as unfair competition > > https://www.techinasia.com/qihoo-360-loses-chinas-courts-ordered-pay-sogou-82-million-unfair-competition > > > > > > > > I hope the above show that the odds are if the original StartCom systems are restored, we're likely to continue to have significant BR violations - a pattern StartCom has repeatedly demonstrated over several years. Similarly, if we were to accept trust in Qihoo, then we would be ignoring the precedent Qihoo has set of choosing insecure and anti-user behaviours masked as "security". > > As a Chinese Internet user, I would say that Qihoo has a very negative reputation on China online community for its precedent's malware(maybe not accurate) and some awful actions such as "3Q Battle", installing software sliently, misleading ads, suspiciously collecting data which is believed helping govnerment monitoring citizens and so on. But on the other hand, their product, "360安全卫士" (360 Total Security)(two names are not the same version but I can't find another english name),as I thought, has improved the total security level of China Internet. And it has changed the ecosystem of Chinese anti-malware software,which I don't know it is good or bad. And it's believed that Qihoo have a tight connection with the Great Fire Wall project. > > Since "The Big Brother is Watching you" is not accepted in Mozilla, I thought Qihoo is not trustworthy in operating a CA. > > P.S. Anyone who knows to change the font size of google group? As a non-english native speaker it is hard for me to read such a small size in the content. > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > firstname.lastname@example.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list email@example.com https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy