On 4/3/13, Rob Weir <robw...@apache.org> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 8:57 AM, Alexandro Colorado <j...@oooes.org> wrote: > >> I think restricting this would be a horrible idea, since we still have >> a shortage of developers. Limiting it by permissions and creating a >> red tape would be even more problematic. I think the key here is about >> the aproved releases. I don't really use windows, so I am not very >> familiar with the topic and whole process at hand when installing and >> testing. However I would focus more on the final QA than the initial >> access/commit to the code. >> >> > I'm talking about restricting access for non-programmers, those who have > permissions currently, but who have never ever contributed a single line of > code. No actual programmer would be restricted. > > For the kinds of risks I'm describing QA would accomplish nothing. Any > hacker worth the name would delay activation of an attack until after > millions of copies had already been installed, and then they would activate > the code remotely. >
I think this needs to be solved upstream. Apache could handle this disucssions and then recomend what to do. This "sign" issue affects not only openoffice but most of the Apache projects. I dont think we should solve it in a vacum. > -Rob > > > >> On 4/3/13, Rob Weir <robw...@apache.org> wrote: >> > We're starting to take a deeper look at what is required to integrate >> code >> > signing into the OpenOffice build and release process. As you probably >> know >> > operating systems, especially Windows and MacOS, are now checking for >> > digital signatures and by default prevent users from installing >> > programs >> > that are not signed. We see similar checks being integrated into >> > anti-virus scanners and even web browsers now. >> > >> > One of the things that has come out in discussions is how large a >> > target >> > OpenOffice is, to hackers. We're on track to have 50 million downloads >> in >> > our first year. If someone is able to get a virus or a trojan into our >> > code, they have the ability to cause a huge amount of damage. And if >> > we >> > are also signing our code, then this damage can propagate even faster, >> > since the OS's "let down their guard" somewhat when dealing with signed >> > code. (Signed code == trust). >> > >> > Of course, none of this has ever happened with OpenOffice, but with the >> > stature and reach we have, it is reasonable to believe that we could be >> > a >> > target of opportunity for someone wishing to cause trouble. We should >> > always keep this in mind and make sure that we are taking reasonable >> > precautions to prevent this from happening. >> > >> > One vulnerability, in theory, is that we have over 100 committers (123 >> > to >> > be exact) who have permission to modify the source code in Subversion. >> > Each account is protected by a self-selected passcode. It is not clear >> to >> > me that we even have requirements on password complexity or expiration >> > policies. In any case, the weakness of this approach is not >> > necessarily >> > what you might think -- brute force attack on the password. If someone >> > wants to initiate a "spear phishing" attack against a committer, it >> > would >> > be something like: >> > >> > 1) Standard phishing: a spoofed note from Apache Infra, with some >> invented >> > story that asks you to change your password but first enter your old >> > one >> > for confirmation. It leads you to a fake, non-Apache website. >> > >> > 2) If you use the same passcode on multiple web services and one of >> > them >> is >> > compromised, say by retrieving the passcode hashes, then it is easy to >> > do >> > offline dictionary attacks (rainbow tables, etc.) and figure out your >> > Apache password. >> > >> > 3) If you lose control of your laptop, at a conference, bar, hotel, >> > whatever, even temporarily, someone can gain access to your Subversion >> > account, via applications that cache credentials, like TortoiseSVN. >> > >> > 4) Similar to #3, but by taking control of your laptop via remote >> > means, >> > i.e., via a virus loaded on to your machine via another vulnerability. >> > >> > None of these things have happened to us yet, but all of these things >> > are >> > possible. >> > >> > So how do we reduce this risk? There are a few things we do or should >> > be >> > doing already. >> > >> > 1) Be careful on the machines that you use Subversion from. Treat it >> like >> > a machine where you access your bank account from. If you are visiting >> > risky sites or downloading and installing software from dubious places, >> > then you are putting your Apache account at risk. >> > >> > 2) Use a high-complexity Apache passcode, one not used by you on any >> other >> > service. >> > >> > 3) Change your passcode periodically, say every 90 days. >> > >> > 4) On laptops be sure to set a strong login password, but also where >> > available also a separate harddrive password. These should also be >> strong >> > passwords, not reused, and should be periodically changed. >> > >> > For those who are building binaries for distribution, the above >> > guidance >> is >> > even more critical. >> > >> > Of course, we also protect the code through our CTR process. All >> > active >> > coders should be subscribed to the commits list and should be reviewing >> the >> > changes that are made there. Trust the code, not the person. >> > Remember, >> if >> > we ever are attacked then it will be through someone's compromised >> > account. So if you see an odd check-in, say, from Juergen, don't just >> > accept it saying "Juergen knows what he is doing". If it is odd, then >> > it >> > should be challenged. >> > >> > All of the above should already be going on today. But I'd like to >> propose >> > one change to our current process that will, I think, greatly increase >> > security. This would be to restrict SVN authorization for the code to >> only >> > the subset of committers who are actively coding. We should give this >> > authorization freely to committers who request it. But today we have >> > 123 >> > committers, some of whom have never used Subversion, and some (like me) >> who >> > edit /site and /ooo-site but never touch the code. So we probably have >> 90 >> > or more accounts that don't need access to the source code tree. Since >> > such used accounts are unlikely to be following the best practices >> outlined >> > above (changing passwords periodically, etc.) then they are even more >> > risky. We lose nothing by removing authorization for those users, in >> order >> > to reduce the risk profile. Of course, on request we can easily >> > restore >> > access. But the idea would be to keep the bullets separate from the >> > gun >> by >> > default, to reduce the risk of accidents. >> > >> > One way of implementing this would be to look at all commits for the >> past 6 >> > months (or 1 year?) and remove authorization on /trunk, /tag and >> /branches >> > for those who have not made commits. But preserve authorization for >> > the >> > website directories. >> > >> > Thoughts? >> > >> > -Rob >> > >> >> >> -- >> Alexandro Colorado >> Apache OpenOffice Contributor >> http://es.openoffice.org >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@openoffice.apache.org >> For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@openoffice.apache.org >> >> > -- Alexandro Colorado Apache OpenOffice Contributor http://es.openoffice.org --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@openoffice.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@openoffice.apache.org
