On Mon, Nov 03, 2003 at 10:51:22PM -0600, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > On Monday 03 November 2003 08:46 pm, Toad wrote: > > > They don't have to be world writable. The node that has it writes to it. > > > If it is under an SSK and is signed by that key, it can't do anything and > > > get away with it. Then it enforces only allowing the other keys listed to > > > append their own signed section, that consists of a time stamp, which > > > signifies incrementing the version number by one. So there is no part of > > > the key that cannot be verified to have come from the original publisher > > > or someother person that they trust in incrementing it. Of course that > > > other person could send hundreds of increment requests. (Although it > > > would be easy to limit them to say one a minute or something) It would be > > > obvious who was doing it, just from fetching the key, and then the > > > original author could revoke their key. > > > > They have to be world writable *for frost*. > > Well, for the most part you could just get away with a private board, that > would add you to the list if you submitted your key to a write only board. > However for some things you might want one that anyone with a key could > update. So I suppose the author should be able to do that. Supposing they > were restricted by the author (Specified in the TUK) to one message per > minute, or something. Then a used could generate lots of keys and send lots > of update messages to the board. That would be a problem. (Perhaps some sort > of voting mechanism where if so many people say it does not work it gets > reverted?) Or you could just have an SSK anarchy sort of thing where everyone > uses a single secondary key. > > None the less people could flood boards now, it's just that the software stops > requesting keys if they don't seem to be there or get tagged as spam or > blocked by the user. We could just do the same thing. Then worst case > scenario, we have what we have now.
AFAICS it would be worse with TUKs. It's a different kind of flooding attack - one that would make the TUK useless by forcing the client to poll the KSKs instead, because the TUK has a ridiculous index number. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
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