On Fri, 29 Jun 2018, Dave Crocker wrote:
Not at all. The point of a standard is to say here is what you do if
you want to interoperate. Trying to figure out how to recover when
someone else doesn't follow the spec is a fool's errand, since there
are more ways to misimplement a spec than any of us can imagine.
Your first sentences asserts disagreement, but I don't see how the rest of
the paragraph provides it, since it both looks reasonable and doesn't seem to
contradict what I said.
I think I'm agreeing with you and disagreeing with the person who said
otherwise. If you want to interoperate, implement what the spec says and
don't worry about people who implement it wrong.
I suppose we could put in a sentence or two reminding people that
unlike DKIM, the list of tags in the spec are the only ones allowed in
an ARC header, so don't try to invent new ones.
That's a major decision to make. It impedes innovation, so it should be
justified pretty carefully. In the text.
The alternative is to say to ignore mystery tags, but then we're in the
same swamp we got to with DKIM v=2, tags that modify the intepretation of
the signature. Perhaps we should try and figure out the least bad way of
allowing new signature algorithms, since that's the most likely change to
happen soon.
R's,
John
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