We know that our authentication techniques of SPF, DKIM,  and DMARC work
best when a message is received directly.   Intermediaries introduce the
possibility of misleading credential upgrade and misleading credential
loss, so the problem extends to any type of intermediary, whether it is an
outbound gateway service, an auto-forwarder, or a mailing list.

Assume that an intermediary contacts me, announcing his intent to forward
everything for his UserA@DomainA to my UserB@DomainB.   He wants to
minimize the risk of messages being blocked by misleading credential loss,
so he wants me to accept his role as a forwarder.   How do I evaluate that
request?

My response will be,

"Will you ensure that every forwarded message has been authenticated as
free of impersonation?  If so, then I can delegate that function to you and
I will not have to authenticate your messages."


If DomainA makes that promise and delivers on it, I know that his
authentication will involve a mixture of SPF, DMARC, and local policy, so
it will not be easily verified.

I already use delegated upstream authentication to most ESP messages
received directly.   I trust that they authenticate their clients so that
they can get paid, so I don't need to see a DKIM signature to believe the
>From address is free of impersonation.   Generalizing this approach will
hit these obstacles.

   - Most participants consider authentication to be a nice attribute when
   present, but hardly something important enough to be required.  So they
   cannot make useful promises.
   - Bad guys will attempt to get me to trust them even if they are not
   trustworthy, and I do not know whom to trust.

ARC experience has made things more difficult because we have found
intermediaries which should have been trustworthy, but instead produce ARC
data that is incorrect and misleading.   That bad experience makes any
ARC+Authorization initiative seem dubious, even if the low participation
rates could be overcome.

Doug
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