We know that our authentication techniques of SPF, DKIM, and DMARC work best when a message is received directly. Intermediaries introduce the possibility of misleading credential upgrade and misleading credential loss, so the problem extends to any type of intermediary, whether it is an outbound gateway service, an auto-forwarder, or a mailing list.
Assume that an intermediary contacts me, announcing his intent to forward everything for his UserA@DomainA to my UserB@DomainB. He wants to minimize the risk of messages being blocked by misleading credential loss, so he wants me to accept his role as a forwarder. How do I evaluate that request? My response will be, "Will you ensure that every forwarded message has been authenticated as free of impersonation? If so, then I can delegate that function to you and I will not have to authenticate your messages." If DomainA makes that promise and delivers on it, I know that his authentication will involve a mixture of SPF, DMARC, and local policy, so it will not be easily verified. I already use delegated upstream authentication to most ESP messages received directly. I trust that they authenticate their clients so that they can get paid, so I don't need to see a DKIM signature to believe the >From address is free of impersonation. Generalizing this approach will hit these obstacles. - Most participants consider authentication to be a nice attribute when present, but hardly something important enough to be required. So they cannot make useful promises. - Bad guys will attempt to get me to trust them even if they are not trustworthy, and I do not know whom to trust. ARC experience has made things more difficult because we have found intermediaries which should have been trustworthy, but instead produce ARC data that is incorrect and misleading. That bad experience makes any ARC+Authorization initiative seem dubious, even if the low participation rates could be overcome. Doug
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