Bron,
I was speaking from the viewpoint of a system admin on the receiving side,
DomainB, who is putting controls on inbound forwarding.    There are many
reasons why self-configured forwarding is problematic.   Forwarded messages
that are judged unacceptable by the recipient domain will put the
forwarding domain or server at risk of being blacklisted.   Since every
organization has different filtering rules, it is pretty much guaranteed
that some of the forwarded traffic will be judged unacceptable, and loss of
credentials during forwarding increases this probability.   Malicious
forwarding configurations can be used to harass the forwarding target.
 Mistaken configuration of forwarding can harass an unwitting victim.
 Unauthorized forwarding from business organizations creates a significant
risk of information leakage in violation of privacy regulations.

I was responding to a couple of posts that envisioned a world where
forwarding was arranged by mutual consent between domains and there users.
 Doing so would help to mitigate those risks, but it also runs into
problems.

Doug



On Tue, May 19, 2026 at 5:51 PM Bron Gondwana <brong=
[email protected]> wrote:

> On Tue, May 19, 2026, at 07:42, Douglas Foster wrote:
>
> Assume that an intermediary contacts me, announcing his intent to forward
> everything for his UserA@DomainA to my UserB@DomainB.   He wants to
> minimize the risk of messages being blocked by misleading credential loss,
> so he wants me to accept his role as a forwarder.   How do I evaluate that
> request?
>
>
> Who is "me" in this context?
>
> As a mailbox provider, I would expect to send UserB@DomainB a message
> saying "UserA@DomainA wants to forward to you, click here to approve,
> click here to go to settings page to manage your forwarders".
>
> My response will be,
>
> "Will you ensure that every forwarded message has been authenticated as
> free of impersonation?  If so, then I can delegate that function to you and
> I will not have to authenticate your messages."
>
>
> If DomainA makes that promise and delivers on it, I know that his
> authentication will involve a mixture of SPF, DMARC, and local policy, so
> it will not be easily verified.
>
> I already use delegated upstream authentication to most ESP messages
> received directly.   I trust that they authenticate their clients so that
> they can get paid, so I don't need to see a DKIM signature to believe the
> >From address is free of impersonation.   Generalizing this approach will
> hit these obstacles.
>
>    - Most participants consider authentication to be a nice attribute
>    when present, but hardly something important enough to be required.  So
>    they cannot make useful promises.
>    - Bad guys will attempt to get me to trust them even if they are not
>    trustworthy, and I do not know whom to trust.
>
> ARC experience has made things more difficult because we have found
> intermediaries which should have been trustworthy, but instead produce ARC
> data that is incorrect and misleading.   That bad experience makes any
> ARC+Authorization initiative seem dubious, even if the low participation
> rates could be overcome.
>
> Doug
>
>
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>
> --
>   Bron Gondwana, CEO, Fastmail Pty Ltd / Fastmail US LLC
>   [email protected]
>
>
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