On Tue, May 19, 2026, at 19:28, Douglas Foster wrote: > Bron, > I was speaking from the viewpoint of a system admin on the receiving side, > DomainB, who is putting controls on inbound forwarding. There are many > reasons why self-configured forwarding is problematic. Forwarded messages > that are judged unacceptable by the recipient domain will put the forwarding > domain or server at risk of being blacklisted. Since every organization has > different filtering rules, it is pretty much guaranteed that some of the > forwarded traffic will be judged unacceptable, and loss of credentials during > forwarding increases this probability. Malicious forwarding configurations > can be used to harass the forwarding target. Mistaken configuration of > forwarding can harass an unwitting victim. Unauthorized forwarding from > business organizations creates a significant risk of information leakage in > violation of privacy regulations. > > I was responding to a couple of posts that envisioned a world where > forwarding was arranged by mutual consent between domains and there users. > Doing so would help to mitigate those risks, but it also runs into problems.
That's a lot of kind of general statements that I don't think illuminate much, and it's really hard to design from them. Yes, you identify some considerations a system administrator has when accepting forwarded messages. "Email is hard, let's go shopping" -- Barbie, circa 1995, probably. It's hard. I acknowledge that it's hard, and DKIM2 isn't going to a magic bullet that makes everything easy. We're trying to build a system that makes some difficult problems more tractable. I haven't seen anything in your responses so far which either propose a better way to solve said problems, or show that DKIM2 will make said problems harder than the currently are. Just that "they will remain hard" I agree. They WILL remain hard. But at least DKIM2 will help the receiving system look through the (user configured) forwarder, and more reliably know whodunnit on the unacceptable forwarded traffic. Which means that a well behaved forwarder doing DKIM2 is *less* likely to be blacklisted (sic) than under previous arrangements, because the recipient can tell that they are innocent of the wrongdoing. That's not nothing. Sure it's not perfect, particularly during the early stages, but it's positive improvement over throwing up our hands and not trying. Bron. -- Bron Gondwana, CEO, Fastmail Pty Ltd / Fastmail US LLC [email protected]
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