Dear Ralph, they don't explicitly write that they recommend IRV, but the study is written in such a manner that a naive reader will necessarily get to the conclusion that IRV was the best method.
****** Example 1: In this study, they compare FPP, Approval Voting, Borda, Condorcet, and IRV. In the summary, they criticize FPP, Approval Voting, Borda, and Condorcet for being vulnerable to manipulation. But they don't criticize IRV for being vulnerable to manipulation. A naive reader will get to the conclusion that IRV was immune to manipulation. Otherwise, this criticism doesn't make any sense. ****** Example 2: Usually, a "spoiler" is a candidate A who takes away the win from candidate B _without being elected_. But in this study, they define a "spoiler" as a "third candidate" who takes away the win from one of the other two candidates. For example, suppose candidate A is the Democratic candidate and candidate B is the Republican candidate. Suppose candidate C is an independent candidate. Suppose furthermore that a Condorcet-consistent single-winner election method is being used and that candidate C is the Condorcet winner. Then candidate C is _not_ a spoiler according to the common definition of "spoilers". But according to the definition in this study, candidate C is a spoiler. For example, in the glossary they write: "Spoiler effect: Occurs when a third candidate takes enough votes away from a candidate that it causes the candidate to lose." In the summary, they write that IRV "eliminates problems of spoiler candidates knocking off major candidates". ****** Example 3: In this study, they always stress that Approval Voting, Borda, and Condorcet were good methods only according to "mathematical" considerations. They always stress that IRV's violation of monotonicity was only a "mathematical" problem. They always stress that only mathematicians consider e.g. the Condorcet criterion and the monotonicity criterion important. ****** Therefore, a naive reader will get the impression that they have done a good job in analyzing the different election methods and that IRV was the best method to "ensure majority rule" and to get rid of the spoiler problem. ****** You wrote (10 Oct 2004): > If you are an advocate of IRV, you are going to have to > support your position with better evidence than this. I disagree with you. In my opinion, this study clearly is in favor of IRV. This contradicts your claim that you need better evidence. In my opinion, this study rather raises other problems: Problem 1: In the summary the fact that there is not a single Condorcet-consistent method, but rather a very large number of Condorcet-consistent methods is used as an argument against Condorcet-consistent methods. They write: "The Condorcet system does not always produce a winner. As a result, election officials must decide before the election on a method to break a tie." "Condorcet may result in a tie that requires pre-election decision on how to break tie." Problem 2: We need an evidence _from a professional law scientist_ that Condorcet-consistent methods are not unconstitutional. Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
