> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part - > > What are the counter-intuitive results of Approval? > > ---- > D- A *real* first choice can lose (if rankings were being used). > > 48 A > 3 AC > 1 BC > 48 C > > 100 > > Approval > > A 51 (all *real* first choice votes) > B 1 > C 52 (wins using simple Approval) (very unlikely but it can happen)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote- But you don't show why the AC voters would WANT to vote this way. Assuming the three voters prefer A to C, your example above is equivalent to a ranked example where the same three rank A and C equal in first place, for unknown reasons, and with the same result. 48 A > B=C 3 A=C > B 1 B=C > A 48 C > A=B If the voters under either Approval or Condorcet wish to vote this way, perhaps because they perceive B or some other unlisted candidate as more of a threat, then I have no problem with this. It's up to the individual voters to weight the costs and benefits of any voting strategy. ----- D-- Please again note the *(if rankings were being used)* language which means that Approval is NOT being used but that the votes are > 48 A > [B=C] > 3 A > C > [B] > 1 B > C > [A} > 48 C > [A=B] 100 I still see 51 A in first place (regardless of the *utility* of any A, B or C votes on a plus 100 percent to minus 100 percent *absolute* scale). As usual I note that the ballots do not say if the voters are being sincere or insincere (is that a requirement ??). If rankings (1, 2, etc.) ONLY are being used due to a lack of high tech computer voting (i.e. NO head to head math), then if NO choice has a first choice majority, then yet another *simple* tiebreaker would be to do a *musical chairs* elimination --- the choice with the most last place votes repeatedly loses --- an opposite variant of IRV.
