Quoting Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Allen Pulsifer wrote: >> Going back to the example I gave, the Condorcet majority that elected D was >> made up of everyone who did not rank A the highest, i.e., the Not A's, and >> they all coalesced around D. In reality a coalition like that would never >> happen and if it did, it could not be held together. In fact, in the >> example I gave, the only thing that allowed D in the party was the A voters: >> >> 166:A>B>D>C >> 166:A>C>D>B >> 83:A>D>B>C >> 83:A>D>C>B >> etc. >> >> If only a small portion of those voters realized that their strongest >> head-to-head competitor was Candidate D, and then proceeded to downgrade him >> to last place, then under any system D would be shut out and A would win. >> That is what would happen in reality, and IMHO, in order to have healthy >> governance, that is what should happen. > > This is a wonderful example of the fundamental flaw with this class of > argument that I mentioned before. > > Why assume that only the A voters would attempt to manipulate the > election by changing their votes? > > If the B & C voters, who certainly prefer D over A, get a hint that the > A voters are attempting to manipulate the election, they can bury A and > promote D and give D the victory - 500 to 499, which was the sincere > outcome to begin with.
Of course, if things go really wrong, the A voters could end up giving the victory way to candidate C or B. For example, if the A voters all bury D and then B&C voters would see this promotion as an opportunity to win by burying A. Then, if the D voters, knowing they can no longer win and being rather upset with the dishonesty of the A voters, also bury A, you can end up with something like: 166:A>B>D>C 166:A>C>B>D 83:A>B>C>D 83:A>C>B>D 83:B>C>D>A 83:B>D>C>A 83:B>D>C>A 83:C>B>D>A 83:C>D>B>A 83:C>D>B>A 2:D>C>B>A 1:A>B>C>D Granting C the victory as the new Condorcet Winner. Which, of course, brings me back to another point I made earlier that when people start to vote strategically, the potential for _anyone_ to win in such close elections increases dramatically...which, again, is leading me to a currently unprovable conclusion that a good Condorcet Method encourages sincere voting. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
