It seems to me that the framework and the results are underdeveloped, or at least poorly documented, for evaluating the overall possibilities for strategic voting for any specific election method. Criteria have been developed for characterizing election methods about the results they produce when people vote sincerely and what kinds of strategies can be used, but there seems to be much less about what happens when those strategies are applied. What information is needed, what level of collusion is required, under what circumstances does the outcome change, under what circumstances are the opportunities exhausted for any group to change their vote and improve the outcome.
That kind of analysis is useful whether you just want to assess how an election method might perform in practice and what effect it might have on the larger political process, or whether you want to construct a super-method that reduces or eliminates opportunities for insincere voting by making the application of strategy a part of the method. People have certainly thought about these issues and have developed some results, but it seems to be fragmented. What are good resources to read to better understand what is currently known? As Eric outlines below and the subequent discussion highlighted, the issues are not easy untangle. For example, the use of strategies could be quite different in different contexts. The information that is available and the incentives and disincentives to vote strategically could vary significantly depending on whether the balloting is secret, whether the election was a national popular vote for president, a town vote for mayor, a corporate election of directors, or a vote within a legislature or a committee. Blanket statements maybe overlooking some important issues. -- Dave Cary P.S. Thanks to Rob for the DSV link. --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > I have yet to see any convincing arguments that it does. Most of > the > attempts tend to center around a single group of voters attempting > to > manipulate the election to their advantage. The fundamental flaws > with > these particular arguments is that they assume that (a) no other > groups will attempt counter-strategies, (b) that a single group of > > voters will even be capable of obtaining an accurate enough picture > to > figure out how to change their votes - accuracy they would need > appears to be far greater then one is able to obtain with a > scientific > survey of voter opinion and (c) the fact that if multiple groups of > > voters are involved in insincere voting when a Condorcet Method is > > used that the ultimate resolution becomes quite chaotic and the > worst > possible winner may be selected. It is the potential for selected > the > least favorite choice that causes me to believe that a good > Condorcet > Method actually encourages sincere voting. > __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
