Allen Pulsifer wrote: > Getting back to Condorcet, there is a majority in each pair-wise comparison, > but for each pair, it is a different set of voters. There is no way, at the > end of the election, to go back and say "This is the majority that elected > the winner". > > In certain cases, Condorcet can also result in a strange outcomes. Take for > example, the following (admittedly contrived) situation: > > 166:A>B>D>C > 166:A>C>D>B > 83:A>D>B>C > 83:A>D>C>B > 83:B>C>D>A > 83:B>D>A>C > 83:B>D>C>A > 83:C>B>D>A > 83:C>D>A>B > 83:C>D>B>A > 2:D>A>C>B > 1:A>B>C>D > > The total votes is 999. Candidate A, with 499 top rankings, is only 1 vote > shy of a majority. His two second rankings would bring him across the > threshold. Nonetheless, Candidate D, with 2 first preferences and 498 > second preferences is the Condorcet winner. Doesn't that seem backwards?
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