Hello Dave, There are a few things I like about IRV as opposed to Condorcet.
First, I think IRV is a reasonably straight-forward extension of current runoff methods. I think it will be more readily understood and accepted. In contrast, Condorcet could be described as "wonkish". Second, IRV satisfies the "Majority Rules" criteria. In the Majority Rules criteria, at the end of the election, you can point to the group of voters who form a majority and were responsible for the election of the winner. This serves three important purposes. First, it lends legitimacy to the outcome. Second, it tells everyone who the governing coalition is. Third, it provides feedback to the candidates that is critical for making them responsive to the voters. The final effect is not to be underestimated. The candidates are not fixed constellations in the sky that we choose between. Instead, they constantly fine-tune their positions, attempting to maintain the backing of a majority. This fine-tuning is a good thing -- it is what ensures our elected officials represent us. Our two party system however does have issues. It has evolved into a polarized equilibrium, where the Republicans and Democrats have drawn a line that divides the electorate down the middle. Worse, with the primary system, the nominees themselves are at the middle of their respective parties, which is about the 25% percentile point relative to the electorate as a whole. The only centrists tend to be "Blue" candidates from "Red" states, and "Red" candidates from "Blue" states. One of the goals of alternative voting system is to provide a viable way for voters to pick from the middle rather than the extremes. Getting back to Condorcet, there is a majority in each pair-wise comparison, but for each pair, it is a different set of voters. There is no way, at the end of the election, to go back and say "This is the majority that elected the winner". In certain cases, Condorcet can also result in a strange outcomes. Take for example, the following (admittedly contrived) situation: 166:A>B>D>C 166:A>C>D>B 83:A>D>B>C 83:A>D>C>B 83:B>C>D>A 83:B>D>A>C 83:B>D>C>A 83:C>B>D>A 83:C>D>A>B 83:C>D>B>A 2:D>A>C>B 1:A>B>C>D The total votes is 999. Candidate A, with 499 top rankings, is only 1 vote shy of a majority. His two second rankings would bring him across the threshold. Nonetheless, Candidate D, with 2 first preferences and 498 second preferences is the Condorcet winner. Doesn't that seem backwards? Note I believe I may have been incorrect about my previous proposal meeting the Condorcet criteria. While under that proposal a candidate can only be eliminated if he loses a pair-wise comparison, the comparisons happen after candidates have been eliminated and votes redistributed. This would seem to have some sort of effect, but I'm still hashing it over. In addition, the ideal voting system to be monotonic. Classic IRV is recognized as not monotonic. One of the goals of my proposal was to at least find a monotonic method. I don't know if it accomplishes this of not. This may be a problem inherent in IRV: whenever you eliminate a candidate and then retabulate votes, it introduces the potential for non-linearities. With respect to "strategic voting", I believe the ideal voting system would be essentially immune from strategic voting. Each voter would state their sincere preferences, and the tabulation would be responsible for determining the winner as if each voter had executed their optimal strategy. Finally, your comment regarding tabulation and precinct voting is a point well-taken. I have another idea for a possibly improved IRV that I will post separately. Best Regards, Allen Pulsifer ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
