I have not inspected the affidavits for completeness or correctness. I am
only comparing the methods.
Assuming IRV's rules result in declaring A or B winner, it would not care
or look at what this voter may have said about C or D.
Condorcet looks at all that the voters say, and uses all of that in
deciding on a winner - as to C and D the possibilities are:
C>D
D>C
C=D = the voter indicates equal liking by giving them the same rank
or by ranking neither.
DWK
On Sun, 9 Nov 2008 18:54:27 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
Dave Ketchum > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2008 6:02 PM
James seems to be stretching his interpretation a bit far.
Agreed that, while the voter can choose to rank all
candidates, the voter is permitted to omit those least desired.
In Condorcet every ballot is counted. For each the counter considers EVERY
pair of candidates, such as A and B. If the voter has indicated preferring
A>B, that is recorded toward A winning; likewise for B>A.
As to IRV, while using the same ballot, it only looks at enough to satisfy
it purpose - which DOES NOT INCLUDE knowing whether the voters like A
better than B.
I am not stretching my interpretation too far.
In elections to be counted by IRV or Condorcet rules voters will not mark
preferences for candidates among whom they have no
preferences. Thus in a four-candidate election, a ballot paper marked "A, B" indicates that this
voter prefers "A" over "B" and
prefers both "A" and "B" over both "C" and "D", and it tells the Returning Officer that
this voter has no preference between "C" and
"D". In contrast, a ballot paper marked "A, B, C, D" has given the Returning
Officer information about all possible preference
comparisons.
It is clear from the affidavits that ONE of the objections to IRV is that the ballot
paper marked "A, B" will be treated differently
from the ballot paper marked "A, B, C, D", and hence the voting system will
treat the two respective voters differently (and to such
an extent as to be "unconstitutional").
In a Condorcet count these two ballot papers (and hence the respective voters)
would also be treated differently, because the voter
who marked the "A, B" ballot paper could not contribute a vote to the "C, D"
pair-wise contest that is an essential part of
determining which candidate should be elected.
My question was simply that if the effect of THIS difference in an IRV count is
sufficient to make IRV counting "unconstitutional",
why would the effect of THIS difference in a Condorcet count not be sufficient to make
Condorcet counting also "unconstitutional"?
I could easily see how, on THIS ground, IRV counting and Condorcet counting could both be
considered "constitutional" or could both
be considered "unconstitutional", but I have some difficulty is seeing how, on THIS
ground, one could be considered "constitutional"
and the other "unconstitutional".
James Gilmour
On Sun, 9 Nov 2008 16:20:10 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
Kathy Dopp > Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2008 2:17 AM
Your statement oversimplifies and ignores details/differences
between IRV and Condorcet. IRV proponents may pretend not to
know that Condorcet methods do not exhibit most of the flaws
of IRV counting methods. For example, Condorcet, to my
knowledge treats all voters ballots equally, considers all
choices on all ballots,
If I have understood the various submissions correctly, the
principal
objection to IRV on THIS ground, is that the ballot papers
of voters
who express different numbers of preferences are thereby treated
differently, and in such a way and to such an extent that these
differences should render the IRV voting system "unconstitutional".
It is correct that Condorcet counting considers all the preferences
marked on the ballot papers, in a sequence of pair-wise contests.
However, Condorcet counting has no option but to treat differently the
ballot papers of voters who have expressed different numbers of
preferences, because such voters will be excluded from some of the
pair-wise counts.
If this difference in the treatment of ballot papers with different
numbers of preferences would be a "fatal" flaw in IRV, would it not
also be a "fatal" flaw in Condorcet counting, and indeed in any other
voting system where voters may express different numbers of
preferences?
James Gilmour
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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