On Sun, 21 Dec 2008 23:39:31 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
Dave Ketchum > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 3:51 AM
Responding to one thought for IRV vs C (Condorcet):
My comments were not specific to "IRV versus Condorcet".
JG had written
When there is no majority winner they may well be prepared to take a
compromising view, but there are some very real difficulties in
putting that into effect for public elections.
Given that a majority of first preferences name Joe, IRV and
C will agree that Joe wins.
Given four others each getting 1/4 of first preferences, and
Joe getting a majority of second preferences:
IRV will award one of the 4, for it only looks at first preferences
in deciding which is a possible winner.
C will award one of the 5. Any of them could win, but Joe is
stronger any outside the 5.
The "problem" cases I had in mind were much less extreme.
When there is a strong Condorcet winner, I think the idea would be sellable to
ordinary electors (but there are remaining problems
about covering the rare event of cycles). What I think would be completely
unsellable would be the weak Condorcet winner. That
winner would, of course, truly be the Condorcet winner - no question, but
that does not mean the result would be politically
acceptable to the electorate. Such a weak winner would also be considered
politically weak once in office.
It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected by
Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35%
and 33% for the other two candidates. But I find it completely unimaginable,
ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first
preferences could be elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the
other two candidates had 48% and 47% of the first
preferences. Condorcet winner - no doubt. But effective President - never!
Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely.
Second preferences?
That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates.
The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for they
are likely enemies of each other.
The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5% makes this seem
possible.
Could elect a candidate who got no first preference votes? Seems
unlikely.
I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and
acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate.
Any other unlikely to be a winner.
What were you thinking of as weak winner?
James
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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