On Sat, 20 Dec 2008 19:19:02 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
I don't have time to read any of the extended essays that now feature on this
list, but these two remarks in a recent post caught my
eye and I could not let them pass.
Responding to one thought for IRV vs C (Condorcet):
Reflecting the diversity of voters' views is, of course, impossible when a
single winner is required in a single-office election
(e.g. city mayor, state governor). In this situation there MAY be a case for
suggesting that one of the purposes of the public
election should be to simulate compromise. However, even then, most of our
voters would expect the winner to be the candidate who
has a majority of the first preferences even if some other candidate had greater overall
"compromise" support, i.e. they would
expect LNH to apply and operate. When there is no majority winner they may
well be prepared to take a compromising view, but there
are some very real difficulties in putting that into effect for public
elections.
Given that a majority of first preferences name Joe, IRV and C will agree
that Joe wins.
Given four others each getting 1/4 of first preferences, and Joe getting a
majority of second preferences:
IRV will award one of the 4, for it only looks at first preferences
in deciding which is a possible winner.
C will award one of the 5. Any of them could win, but Joe is
stronger any outside the 5.
James Gilmour
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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