At 01:24 AM 12/16/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 02:58:29 +0000 (GMT)
> From: Kevin Venzke <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
>
> Hi,
>
> --- En date de?: Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<[email protected]> a ?crit?:
>> > >> That's not very generous. I can think of
>> a couple of defenses. One would
>> > >> be to point out that it is necessitated by
>> the other criteria that IRV
>> > >> satisfies. All things being equal, I consider
>> LNHarm more desirable than
>> > >> monotonicity, for instance.
Abd ul,
That is about the strangest position I've seen you take on any subject
because it is equivalent to saying that it is more important for a
voting method not to hurt my lower choice candidates than my first
choice candidates.
I didn't write that. Venzke's quotation got all messed up. If you get
the list mail and keep it, look back at my post. Venzke wrote that
thing about monotonicity.
LNH, has, I think, been pretty widely misunderstood. I don't consider
it desirable *at all*. That is, it interferes with the very desirable
process of compromise that public elections should simulate. However,
Bucklin Voting allows a voter-controllable level of LNH compliance
that I consider good. Pure Approval doesn't allow sufficient
flexibility of expression. Range only allows preference expression,
of a favorite over a frontrunner, with some sacrifice of voting
strength in the real election. That may be a good thing, but
politically, at this point, concern over this, including Later No
Harm, inhibits the adoption of Approval, though it really ought to be
totally obvious that Approval is a huge bang-for-the-buck reform:
Open Voting, Count All the Votes. Free. And actually one of the
better methods, considering how simple it is.
Bucklin uses an RCV ballot, but is much, much simpler to count, and
doesn't suffer from the serious pathologies that afflict IRV. Monotonic.
I.e. Monotonicity is, briefly stated, "first no harm".
So you are saying that you don't want a voter's second choice to hurt
the voter's first choice, but you don't mind if the voter's first
choice hurts the voter's first choice.
I find that position to be very bizarre.
So do I. However, in defense of Venzke, he thinks that the situations
where IRV is non-monotonic are rare enough that it's not worth worrying about.
But nonmonotonicity is a clue that there is something seriously wrong
with the amalgamation method, it's quirky and unreliable. The real
bite is with Center Squeeze.
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