On Mar 5, 2010, at 8:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:


On Mar 4, 2010, at 1:04 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...

so, i'm for Condorcet too. i am sorta agnostic about what to do about a cycle (because i really doubt it will happen at all often in reality) as long as it's a sensible resolution (Shulze would be okay if it was easy for a layman to understand, so probably Ranked Pairs is the simplest, but i might just say give it to the Plurality winner in the Smith set to toss the IRV haters a bone).


...

i like Ranked Pairs best, too. and if the Smith Set are three candidates, it and Shulze pick the same winner.

Bringing Plurality in would be a distraction, since we have no need to go near this method and risk a worse answer.

it's a "worse answer" in a weird circumstance where an argument could be made that any in the Smith set have some reasonable claim or legitimacy to be elected. why not the guy with the most votes?

Further, our calculating has not necessarily identified which cycle member would win this (though my method of doing the N*N matrix does provide this).

BTW - we should not discourage bullet voting - we should NOT encourage voters to go beyond their desires, doing what is really nonsense ranking.

i don't think Condorcet encourages bullet voting at all.

but i *do* think that Approval *does* suggest the possibility of bullet voting. even though we're limited to 6 in my county, the weird way that the Vermont State Senate is elected is that all state senators are elected at large in your county. so then more populous counties have more state senators than smaller ones (they all get at least 1). anyway, we vote for up to six out of a zillion candidates since each party proffers 6 candidates, we have Progs and Greens, and there are independents. the six candidates with the most votes are elected. what if there is one, maybe two candidates that you really think should be elected? i almost never vote for all 6. usually just 2. but it's a strategic vote. and since i didn't hit the limit, it's practically no different than Approval voting. i cannot see how Warren and company claim that it's less strategic than Condorcet.

--

r b-j                  [email protected]

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."




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