1. The Axiomatic System and its Domain of Application
an axiomatic system is not itself about anything; so, facts neither
support nor challenge it; and, consequently, the system says nothing
about anything.
when an axiomatic system is linked to some other domain which it is said
to model, facts about that domain become relevant.
here's how it works. I'll start with one of my axioms: (x)(-Nx)
that's it. you have no idea what it's about because I haven't specified
the domain to which I'm applying this axiom; and, since I have not yet
specified what 'N' represents, you have no idea what I'm saying about
that domain.
of course, you know just from logic that I'm saying 'for any x that is x
is not 'N'. you also know the following equivalence:
(x)(-Nx) <-> -(Ex)(Nx)
now you know how to falsify my claim (once you find out what domain it
applies to and which facts become pertinent): you show (Ex)(Nx) --- you
prove that there is an x that is N.
okay, now I'll link this axiom to the domain to which I apply it, the
language of psycho-philosophical inquiry. it is the definition of 'is'.
where N = not nothing, (x)(-Nx) translates into 'for any x that is, x is
not nothing'. this is logically equivalent to the right side; -(Ex)(Nx)
translates into 'it is not the case that there is an x such that x is
nothing'.
now that I've linked the axiom to its domain of application, you know
how facts are relevant. you can only falsify my axiom by demonstrating
(Ex)(Nx) --- by presenting an x that is, but which is nothing.
good luck with that.
2. Comparison with the Metanomski Axiom of Awareness, MAA
[Georges, until you tell us what you've named your axiom, I'm calling it
the Metanomski Axiom of Awareness or MAA.]
your axiom is: all elements of the human universe are relative,
excepting awareness, its utmost absolute foundation.
this is not stated in a very abstract manner, so it is difficult to
distinguish the axiom from the domain of application; and, to see when
facts are relevant to the issue at hand: whether the axiom adequately
describes the domain to which it allegedly applies.
3. Confronting DoubleSpeak
now, Georges, let us confront the doublespeak (using 'doublespeak' in
the classic orwellian sense).
on the one hand you say that one of the ways in which to challenge an
axiomatic system is to use facts to show that it is false (ie that it
does not adequately describe its domain of application). however, when
presented with a fact that challenges your system you have avoided
rising to the challenge. instead you have
* invented a rule that your viewpoint can only be challenged from inside
itself.
this rule is obviously bogus; and, is adopted by astrologers and other
pseudo scientists to avoid having to deal with skeptical scientific
challenges.
* you have 'defined' the claimed fact 'I am self-aware' as tautologous.
you do no explain the basis for this judgement. you identified two uses
of 'tautology', one from logic and one from rhetoric, but decline to say
which you are using. furthermore, since a tautology is true under all
circumstances, one would normally think that your axiomatic system would
not have to commodate itself to a tautology; but, you seem to be saying
that your axiom doesn't have to be consistent with a tautology.
* you have 'defined' the awareness described by 'I am self-aware' as
'non-thematic'.
here, again, you refuse to confront the facts. the fact is that you
admit that awareness of a tree is thematic awareness; but, that
awareness of self as subject while simultaneously aware of that same
tree --- somehow that self-awareness is non-thematic.
how is that possible? you've declined to answer.
* you have defended your axiomatic system by introducing facts
you've indicated that awareness is necessarily thematic but without
showing where that conclusion came from. is it a separate axiom? is it a
deduction from the MAA. if so, would you please present the derivation?
is this a conclusion based on facts?
you point to Bachelard in defense of your claim that awareness is
necessarily thematic. but, you've additted that Bachelard didn't say
that. he just spoke about states of awareness that we both recognize as
thematic awareness.
so it is still up to you --- if you are citing Bachelard's observations
as evidence --- to show how Bachelard's discussion of thematic awareness
proves that all awareness is necessarily thematic.
instead, you've tried to obfuscate the issue by claiming I need to show
that Bachelard claimed that non-thematic awareness is possible. that's
ridiculous. I'm not claiming that self-awareness is non-thematic. you
are.
so, it's up to you to show how self-awareness is non-thematic. is that a
separate axiom or is that a deduction from the MAA?
Joe
--
Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the
first person. --- H-N Castaneda
@[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@
http://what-am-i.net
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