At 23:02 06/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure".  That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
the "multiplication" related to low-complexity can be inherited to
high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
proved that "a" UD could be that dumb!

Gosh, Bruno, I don't understand what you are saying. Maybe I am too naive! Or maybe our background conceptions are too different so even if the language is the same it does not make sense. For one I don't see how a first person experience needs to depend on a UD. My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the "observer-state." Note how the observer bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the "nul UD" : it is the maximally dumb UD.

But then why are you sure that lower complexity have higher measure?
I understand intuitively but how would you prove that without introducing a special UD?
A "maximally dumb" UD? I am not sure I understand.


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