Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Jesse Mazer wrote:If you impose the condition I discussed earlier that absoluteprobabilities don't change over time, or in terms of my analogy, that thewater levels in each tank don't change because the total inflow rate toeach tank always matches the total outflow rate, then I don't think it'spossible to make sense of the notion that the observer-moments in thattorture-free minute would have 10^100 times greater absolute measure. Ifthere's 10^100 times more water in the tanks corresponding to OMs duringthat minute, where does all this water go after the tank corresponding tothe last OM in this minute, and where is it flowing in from to the tankcorresponding to the first OM in this minute?As I understood your model, the tanks have constant volume over time(because net inflow matches net outflow), but you never said they all hadthe same volume. If they did, every OM would have the same absolutemeasure, so why bother with the idea of absolute measure at all?

`No, I don't think they don't all have to have the same volume, but I thought`

`you were assuming that the ASSA would force us to conclude there's a 10^100`

`greater chance of finding ourselves as an OM during this minute, an idea`

`that would only be true if the OMs during that minute *did* have the same`

`absolute probability/water volume as OMs at other times. It's true that it's`

`possible to make this example work in terms of the water model if you have`

`each tank during that minute contain only 1/10^100 the amount of water`

`that's in tanks before that minute, but in that case your absolute`

`probability of experiencing an OM in that minute is no higher than at any`

`other time. So if my interpretation of your argument is right, I think`

`you're arguing against a strawman version of the ASSA here.`

It appears that we both believe that any individual's consciousness willcontinue indefinitely, or, as you say in a later post in the currentthread, "death only exists from a third person perspective". However, Idon't really understand the mechanism whereby you believe this will happen.Perhaps you could tell me where we differ:My understanding of observer moments is that, unlike the water molecules inyour tanks, they are *always* created and destroyed. The observer'sexperience of continuity of consciousness over time results from thestringing together of OM's which are related in the following way: at aparticular OM in an observer's stream of consciousness, the "next moment",or successor OM, can be any OM which identifies itself with that observer,shares the observer's memories up to that point, and fits in as acontinuation of the previous OM's thoughts. (These criteria are necessarilysomewhat loose, accounting for situations such as waking up with retrogradeamnesia after a head injury.)

`If you want to have an objective notion of continuity of consciousness and`

`conditional probabilities, then it can't just be a matter of us subjectively`

`evaluating how much one observer-moment's memories seem to match the`

`experiences and memories of an earlier one. Instead, you'd need some sort of`

`theory of consciousness to give you a well-defined, objective procedure for`

`deciding this--this is what I've been calling the "similarity function". If`

`we assume such a thing exists, there are two ways we could think of the`

`"water molecules". One is to say they represent "observers" who persist`

`indefinitely, while "observer-moments" just represent what these observers`

`*experience* at any given moment, not what they are. These observers would`

`have no qualities of their own beyond what they are experiencing at a given`

`moment, a bit like the "pure witnessing consciousness" thought to be our`

`true self in certain eastern philosophies. If this seems too close to the`

`dualistic idea of a "soul", another option is just to say the water`

`molecules represent a convenient way to think about conditional and absolute`

`probabilities in frequentist terms, since it's generally more intuitive to`

`think about any kind of probability in a frequentist way (rather than, say,`

`a Bayesian way or a decision-theory way). So in this case the water`

`molecules would just be a sort of intuition-pump, they wouldn't have any`

`deeper significance.`

Death (from the first person perspective) can be defined as occuring whenthere is no successor OM, anywhere or ever. As long as there remains evenone successor OM, be it in another Galaxy, a parallel universe, orwhatever, the stream of consciousness will continue indefinitely. In themultiverse (or larger mathematical structure containing the multiverse),there will always be a successor OM; hence, the quantum immortality idea.You may agree with at least some of the above, but it looks like you mayhave a problem with my 10^100 copies, which I propose are created, live fora minute, then are destroyed. Didn't I just say death can't happen from afirst person perspective? Going by the definition of death above, if thecopies are to really die, there would have to be no successor OM anywhereor ever (which in this case means the self contained model universe of thethought experiment). But clearly, there *is* a successor OM. As the end ofthe minute approaches, the copies know that the torture is going to startagain. The fact that there is a mismatch between the number ofinstantiations during the minute and after (10^100 -> 10) doesn't make anydifference. This is what the purpose of the thought experiment was: to showthat the absolute measure, which is proportional to the number ofinstantiations of a given OM, cannot make any first person difference.

`But again, if you assume the particular constraint on the *relationship*`

`between absolute and conditional measure I suggested--the "water inflow`

`equals water outflow" condition--then it doesn't seem possible for the`

`combined absolute measure of all OMs during that minute (the total amount of`

`water in all the tanks corresponding to OMs in that minute) to be larger`

`than the combined absolute measure of all OMs during the minute before or`

`after.`

`Also, let me suggest another way absolute measure makes a difference from a`

`first-person perspective. Even if I take QTI for granted, I still can have`

`questions about what my most likely future experiences are going to be,`

`since I don't know exactly how the conditional probability function works.`

`In particular, I don't know if in the distant future I will still remember`

`most of the details of my current life and everything beyond, so that I will`

`consciously perceive myself to be 10 million years old at some point, or if`

`I will experience a sort of "immortality with amnesia" where I will`

`repeatedly perceive myself as being fairly young (I described some ways this`

`could work in the last paragraph of my post at`

`http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m6813.html ). But now if I use the`

`ASSA, assuming that my current observer-moment is randomly sampled from the`

`set of all observer-moments, weighted by their absolute probability, then`

`observing that my age is only 28, I should consider "immortality with`

`amnesia" much more likely, because if it wasn't the vast majority of the`

`"water" would be found in observer-moments which perceive themselves to be`

`Very Old (say, over 1 million years old). Note that this conclusion only`

`works if you assume the amount of water in each tank stays constant--if the`

`amount of water in different tanks could change as some sort of cosmic time`

`parameter moved forward, then it might be that young OMs would be favored by`

`the ASSA at earlier values of the cosmic time parameter, while old OMs would`

`be favored by the ASSA at later values of the cosmic time parameter, so I`

`could no longer use the fact that I find myself to be only a few decades old`

`to conclude that the conditional probabilities are unlikely to allow me to`

`continually experience OMs that perceive themselves as being older and`

`older.`

Jesse