Bruno writes

> [Hal wrote]
> > I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds
> > can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be
> > simulated on a TM.
> They are wrong.

Note that this is just Bruno's opinion.  Hal's statement really
is true: most people don't agree with Bruno on this.

> If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot  
> perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds  
> can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable.  

I don't pretend to understand this at all. You are saying
that minds (e.g. we) cannot *perceive* something as being
provably non-turing-emulable, yet minds can nonetheless
*prove* that something is non-turing-emulable.

I (very naively, of course) would have supposed that as soon
as a mind proved that X was Y, then that very mind would
have perceived that X was provably Y.

How confusing.


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