Bruno writes > [Hal wrote] > > I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds > > can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be > > simulated on a TM. > > They are wrong.
Note that this is just Bruno's opinion. Hal's statement really is true: most people don't agree with Bruno on this. > If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot > perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds > can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable. I don't pretend to understand this at all. You are saying that minds (e.g. we) cannot *perceive* something as being provably non-turing-emulable, yet minds can nonetheless *prove* that something is non-turing-emulable. I (very naively, of course) would have supposed that as soon as a mind proved that X was Y, then that very mind would have perceived that X was provably Y. How confusing. Lee
