Bruno writes: > OK. But the word "universe" can be misleading here. It is probably less > misleading to say that the Universal Dovetailer generates all > computations. By assuming comp, this generates also all the (first > person) observer-moments (states/worlds/...). > The physical reality will emerge from that, but there is no a priori > reason to believe the UD generates any particular physical reality, > although we have empirical reason that some quantum dovetailer will win > the "measure" battle.
Isn't it hard, even assuming comp, to know whether a particular computation corresponds to a particular first-person observer-moment? Comp says that I am a computation, at some level of abstraction; but having faith in that principle will not tell me whether a given computation implements me. How can I bridge that gap? > If that means that my probable future, when I am in a comp state S, is > entirely determined by the collection of computations going through S, > with "intrinsical weight" determined by the UD (and thus by theoretical > computer science alone), then OK. Right, and the same question applies. To know if a given computation represents one of my first-person probable futures, I have to know quite a bit. I need to know how to go from a computation to a first-person experience; and I need to know details of my own first-person experiences so that I can judge whether a computation "matches" my experiences. That second part is obvious, I guess; I can be assumed to be aware of my own experiences. But the first part is what is hard, looking at a computation and deciding what kind of mind it creates. Do your theories offer insights into this hard part? Hal Finney
