Bruno writes:
> OK. But the word "universe" can be misleading here. It is probably less 
> misleading to say that the Universal Dovetailer generates all 
> computations. By assuming comp, this generates also all the (first 
> person) observer-moments (states/worlds/...).
> The physical reality will emerge from that, but there is no a priori 
> reason to believe the UD generates any particular physical reality, 
> although we have empirical reason that some quantum dovetailer will win 
> the "measure" battle.

Isn't it hard, even assuming comp, to know whether a particular
computation corresponds to a particular first-person observer-moment?
Comp says that I am a computation, at some level of abstraction;
but having faith in that principle will not tell me whether a given
computation implements me.  How can I bridge that gap?

> If that means that my probable future, when I am in a comp state S,  is 
> entirely determined by the collection of computations going through S, 
> with "intrinsical weight" determined by the UD (and thus by theoretical 
> computer science alone), then OK.

Right, and the same question applies.  To know if a given computation
represents one of my first-person probable futures, I have to know quite
a bit.  I need to know how to go from a computation to a first-person
experience; and I need to know details of my own first-person experiences
so that I can judge whether a computation "matches" my experiences.

That second part is obvious, I guess; I can be assumed to be aware of
my own experiences.  But the first part is what is hard, looking at a
computation and deciding what kind of mind it creates.  Do your theories
offer insights into this hard part?

Hal Finney

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