Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

[George Levy]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this make to his experience? It seems to me that there is no test or experiment the person could do which would allow him to determine if he is living in a period of high measure or low measure. If an OM is the smallest discernible unit of conscious experience, it therefore seems reasonable to treat multiple instantiations of the same OM as one OM. Yes Stathis, I agree with you completely. Bruno wrote: And this already comes from the fact that the "indistinguishabilitty/distinguishabilitty" crux is itself relative. By loosing memory something distinguishable can become indistinguishable, augmenting the class of (normal) self-consistent extensions. Bruno, I find this question extremely difficult. Is indistinguishability established at the physical level or at the psychological level? If we say it is established at the psychological level, then even mental errors ( ie.6+7=11) count in defining a whole world. This is the ultimate in relativism. I can find reasons to go either way. (Ultimately Undecided?) Then I am open that from the 1 point of view, fusion increases measure, duplication decreases measure; although from the 3 pov it is the contrary. I do not agree with you on this point Bruno. >From the one person point of view measures remains constant just like the speed of light, the mass of an electron, or the number of points in a line 1 meter long or 1 kilometer long. (the number of points in a continuum is always the same no matter what the length of the line is). The one person always observes a continuum in the number of opportunities available to him no matter what his past history is. >From the third person point of view, it makes sense to consider ratios in measures, just like it makes sense to take ratios of line segments of different lengths. George