Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 21-juil.-06, à 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
> 
>>If there is anything left over.  I don't think it is sufficiently 
>>appreciated that this
>>"unknowability" is an assumption.
> 
> 
> No bigger than the "assumption" that "other" minds exists (a key 
> assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).

Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds and that 
we cannot possibly 
know what their experiences are like?

> 
> And then it is a theorem that for any correct machine there are true 
> propositions about them that the machine cannot prove.

And there are true propositions about itself that the machine cannot prove - 
but are they 
"experiences"?  Certainly there are myriad true propositions about what my 
brain is doing that I am 
not, and cannot be aware of, but they aren't experiences.

Brent Meeker

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