Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 21-juil.-06, à 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > >>If there is anything left over. I don't think it is sufficiently >>appreciated that this >>"unknowability" is an assumption. > > > No bigger than the "assumption" that "other" minds exists (a key > assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).
Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds and that we cannot possibly know what their experiences are like? > > And then it is a theorem that for any correct machine there are true > propositions about them that the machine cannot prove. And there are true propositions about itself that the machine cannot prove - but are they "experiences"? Certainly there are myriad true propositions about what my brain is doing that I am not, and cannot be aware of, but they aren't experiences. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
