George Levy wrote: > Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own > existence is contingent on our observation.
Hi George I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it might be expressed as: First person perception of the world comes about when our own observation and existence are mutually contingent > Third person perception comes about in situations when our own existence > is not contingent on our observation. Now here I'm not so clear. I understand what you mean in terms of the quantum suicide. The observers observe the deceased version of the suicide and he does not, but here surely it is *their* observations that are relevant, and these are first person by your definition. The suicide doesn't get to have any further 'observations' on this branch - not because the ontology of his dead body has magically changed out of FP1, but because the 'observational activity' within his first-personal domain has shut down. To make this perhaps intuitively clearer, suppose it turns out that although he is definitively 'dead' by the medical standards of the observers, Mr Spock from Star Trek turns up and resuscitates him with advanced technology. In this case, he starts to 'observe' again, but once more we need posit no change of ontology. In sum, I'm not clear what sort of observation is *not* contingent on our existence, except someone else's observation, and so far as I can see this is always first person by your definition. Do you simply mean to define any observation not involving ourselves as 'third person' from our point-of-view? OK but I don't see where it gets us. We appear to agree that all observations are first person from the point-of-view of the observer, IMO in virtue of instantiation in a primitive first person context (FP1g). All representations of such observations in the 'shareable knowledge base' (SKB) of an FP1i person are likewise instantiated in this context with the rest of his model of the world, and are flexibly metaphorised as 'third' (TP) or 'first' person (but importantly in this latter case FP2, as I discuss below - the representation of 'my arm' is not my arm). An example of a flexible re-metaphorisation is that I may shift the representation of 'my arm' from FP2 to TP if it is amputated. Thus third person in my schema refers exclusively to the relata comprising the content of a first person observation (i.e. one that is contingent on our existence). Consequently all observations entail third person relata, but both the observations and the relata are exclusively instantiated in a first person context. The structure of the context *comprises* the third person relational model, which through inter-personal communication (instantiation of the SKB) is thus mutually interrogable on a precisely equal epistemological footing by ourselves or others. This is the third person world which is the content of our experience and discourse, and its referential correspondence with the remainder of the FP1g context could be modelled semantically as a network of co-varying nodes. Those 'nodes' modelled within the SKB as other 'first persons' I term FP2i to crucially distinguish them from embodied FP1i first persons. FP2i are thus co-varying third person analogs of embodied or instantiated first persons. I believe that terminological confusion around these issues leads directly to many conceptual problems. > More generally, one can assume that the laws of physics themselves are > contingent on the observer -ie. the world is being destroyed every > nanoseconds or faster when it diverges into MW branches not supporting > life. - the only worlds we can observe are those worlds upholding those > physical laws supporting life. Do you mean: The observer is contingent on the laws of physics (i.e. there can be observation only where the laws of physics permit this)? According to this hypothesis our primary > perception of the world is first person. I agree that perception is first person, and as I have already said I don't understand what could be meant by an observation not contingent on our existence, except that it is some other observer's (first person) observation. However I'm not sure that your hypothesis replaces my schema. What you appear to be saying is that we can't observe situations where either we're not present or alive to observe (but in either case someone else could be observing), or situations which in their nature cannot sustain observers (in which case nobody is observing). I would agree with all of this, but I would like you to comment further on the implications for the basic ontology of existence per se - e.g. what you consider 'real' as opposed to metaphorical distinctions of ontology, which is what my schema attempts to address. David > 1Z wrote: > > >>I don't even know what you mean by "first person". > >> > >> > >> > >David Nyman wrote: > >Peter > > > >It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what > >I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned > >to distinguish two basic meanings, which failing to specify IMO causes > >a lot of confusion: > > > >1) First person 1 (FP1) - the point-of-view that is directly claimed by > >an individual (FP1i) such as David or Peter, or what is generally meant > >when the word 'I' is directly uttered by such a person. > > > >2) First person 2 (FP2) - representations of an FP1 point-of-view as > >modelled within members of the FP1 community. The usage of 'David' or > >'Peter' in point 1) exemplifies one type of such representation, whose > >presumed referent is an FP1i person. > > > > > Here is an explanation more grounded in Physics: > The concept of "first person" comes directly from the Everett > manyworlds, Schoedinger cat experiment and the quantum suicide > (thought) experiment. In a quantum suicide the subject of the experiment > does not see himself dying. He can only see himself continuing living > along a branch of the manyworld in which his experiment went awry. His > perception is first person. Witnesses to the experiment are likely to > see the subject die and their point of view is third person. Thus first > person and third person imply some kind of "relativity" contingent on > the observer's own existence. > > More generally, one can assume that the laws of physics themselves are > contingent on the observer -ie. the world is being destroyed every > nanoseconds or faster when it diverges into MW branches not supporting > life. - the only worlds we can observe are those worlds upholding those > physical laws supporting life. According to this hypothesis our primary > perception of the world is first person. > > Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own > existence is contingent on our observation. > Third person perception comes about in situations when our own existence > is not contingent on our observation. > > George > > --------------060100020308080401040600 > Content-Type: text/html > X-Google-AttachSize: 2538 > > <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> > <html> > <head> > <meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type"> > <title></title> > </head> > <body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000"> > 1Z wrote:<br> > <blockquote > cite="[EMAIL PROTECTED]" > type="cite"> > <blockquote type="cite"> > <pre wrap="">I don't even know what you mean by "first person". > > </pre> > </blockquote> > <pre wrap=""><!---->David Nyman wrote: > Peter > > It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what > I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned > to distinguish two basic meanings, which failing to specify IMO causes > a lot of confusion: > > 1) First person 1 (FP1) - the point-of-view that is directly claimed by > an individual (FP1i) such as David or Peter, or what is generally meant > when the word 'I' is directly uttered by such a person. > > 2) First person 2 (FP2) - representations of an FP1 point-of-view as > modelled within members of the FP1 community. The usage of 'David' or > 'Peter' in point 1) exemplifies one type of such representation, whose > presumed referent is an FP1i person. > </pre> > </blockquote> > Here is an explanation more grounded in Physics:<br> > The concept of "first person" comes directly from the Everett > manyworlds, Schoedinger cat experiment and the quantum suicide > (thought) experiment. In a quantum suicide the subject of the > experiment does not see himself dying. He can only see himself > continuing living along a branch of the manyworld in which his > experiment went awry. His perception is first person. Witnesses to the > experiment are likely to see the subject die and their point of view is > third person. Thus first person and third person imply some kind of > "relativity" contingent on the observer's own existence. <br> > <br> > More generally, one can assume that the laws of physics themselves are > contingent on the observer -ie. the world is being destroyed every > nanoseconds or faster when it diverges into MW branches not supporting > life. - the only worlds we can observe are those worlds upholding those > physical laws supporting life. According to this hypothesis our primary > perception of the world is first person. <br> > <br> > Thus first person perception of the world comes about when <u>our own > existence is contingent </u>on our observation.<br> > Third person perception comes about in situations when <u>our own > existence is not contingent</u> on our observation.<br> > <br> > George<br> > </body> > </html> > > --------------060100020308080401040600-- --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
