George Levy wrote:

> Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
> deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is
> secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers
> share the same frame of reference. This frame of reference consists of
> identical contingencies on their existence.

I'm glad you find agreement here.  I don't think any of us deny the
existence of a third person perspective.  All three of us, I think,
agree that it is secondary, but where your 'third person' comes into
being through the sharing of a frame of reference, I'm applying the
term to the totality of 'frames of reference', whether shared or not.
Your 'shared frame of reference' would seem to be achieved through my
'shareable knowledge base', but for me a frame of reference is always
third person from one perspective or many. So I'm saying that third
person is an illusion brought about simply in virtue of having a 'frame
of reference' at all - the illusion inherent in representing the world.
I'm not quite sure what to do about this inconsistency of terminology.
Perhaps the 'shared illusion' could be 'objectivity'?

 I have a little bit of trouble understanding your terms: "shared
> knowledge base" and interpersonal discourse.

I mean 'frames of reference' or models of the world, as our medium for
communicating with ourselves and each other - i.e. 'inter-personal
discourse'.  Our personal epistemology is a function of our
instantiating such models, and such individual perpectives can become
correlated through pooling their contents in a 'shared knowledge base'.
This affords the possibility of a common frame of reference.

Thus
> our basic thinking process is rooted in the physical objects comprising
> our brain. These physical objects owe their existence to our shared
> contingencies.

This  is consistent with what I've said above - the 'models' are
instantiated in 'the physical objects comprising our brain', at least
under certain descriptions, although I don't take these descriptions to
be irreducible.

Here we are developing an equivalence between mental
> processes and physical processes.

OK with the same proviso.

In other words I can imagine any
> process that the universe is capable of supporting

I'm not sure how one would demonstrate this.

 and it is possible
> to simulate in the universe any thought process that I am capable of
> imagining.

According to some!  However, I would agree with the proviso that
'simulate' can include making an atom-for-atom copy of your brain.
Possibly in other ways too, but I'd be prepared to settle for the
atoms!  I think we can agree that what is modelled or imagined in one
brain can be shared by another, although some might see these dialogues
as a strike against this!  I've suggested in earlier posts, in effect,
that because what we can imagine and what we can share are constrained
to exactly the same 'language', all members of a community of persons
are thereby on an equal epistemic footing (i.e. the third person
perspective, in my terms) with respect to 'knowledge about the world'.
This is what I meant by the 'shareable knowledge base', but the term
itself is dispensable.

David




> David Nyman wrote:
>
> >George Levy wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >>Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only
> >>relevent contingency is: If  the observed event will result in different
> >>probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
> >>our perceptions will be different.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >I understand this way of putting it.
> >
> >
> >
> >>Third person perception comes about when several observers share the
> >>same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies
> >>on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of
> >>reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have
> >>discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all
> >>these observer have a first person perspective, however this first
> >>person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and
> >>therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective
> >>can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same
> >>only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of
> >>objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher
> >>level and accept that different observers will predictably see different
> >>things, just like in relativity theory different observers may
> >>predictably make different measurements of the same object.
> >>
> >>
> >
> >Again I agree here. In the terminology I've been using, the frame of
> >reference would be communicated in terms of the 'shareable knowledge
> >base', or inter-personal (third person) discourse.  What you are saying
> >above seems consistent with Colin Hales' views both on 1-person primacy
> >and the nature of 3-person.  Any comments on those?
> >
> >David
> >
> >
>
> Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
> deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is
> secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers
> share the same frame of reference. This frame of reference consists of
> identical contingencies on their existence.
>
> I have a little bit of trouble understanding your terms: "shared
> knowledge base" and interpersonal discourse. One way to force your
> nomenclature and mine to be identical is to say that "share knowledge
> base" and interpersonal discourse" are completely dependent on physical
> laws which are completely dependent of the shared contingencies. Thus
> our basic thinking process is rooted in the physical objects comprising
> our brain. These physical objects owe their existence to our shared
> contingencies. Here we are developing an equivalence between mental
> processes and physical processes. In other words I can imagine any
> process that the universe is capable of supporting, and it is possible
> to simulate in the universe any thought process that I am capable of
> imagining.
>
> George
>
> --------------000108000004070700050202
> Content-Type: text/html
> X-Google-AttachSize: 3330
>
> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
> <html>
> <head>
>   <meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
>   <title></title>
> </head>
> <body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
> David Nyman wrote:<br>
> <blockquote
>  cite="[EMAIL PROTECTED]"
>  type="cite">
>   <pre wrap="">George Levy wrote:
>
>   </pre>
>   <blockquote type="cite">
>     <pre wrap="">Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The 
> only
> relevent contingency is: If  the observed event will result in different
> probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
> our perceptions will be different.
>     </pre>
>   </blockquote>
>   <pre wrap=""><!---->
> I understand this way of putting it.
>
>   </pre>
>   <blockquote type="cite">
>     <pre wrap="">Third person perception comes about when several observers 
> share the
> same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies
> on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of
> reference." I see many similarities with relativity theory which I have
> discussed numerous times on this list in the past. Let's be clear: all
> these observer have a first person perspective, however this first
> person perspective appears to be the same across observers, and
> therefore appears to be *independent* of the observers. This perspective
> can be called *objective* but we must keep in mind that it is the same
> only because the frame of reference is the same. Thus the concept of
> objectivity loses its meaning unless we raise the meaning to a higher
> level and accept that different observers will predictably see different
> things, just like in relativity theory different observers may
> predictably make different measurements of the same object.
>     </pre>
>   </blockquote>
>   <pre wrap=""><!---->
> Again I agree here. In the terminology I've been using, the frame of
> reference would be communicated in terms of the 'shareable knowledge
> base', or inter-personal (third person) discourse.  What you are saying
> above seems consistent with Colin Hales' views both on 1-person primacy
> and the nature of 3-person.  Any comments on those?
>
> David
>   </pre>
> </blockquote>
> <br>
> Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
> deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is
> secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers
> share the same frame of reference. This frame of reference consists of
> identical contingencies on their existence. <br>
> <br>
> I have a little bit of trouble understanding your terms: "shared
> knowledge base" and interpersonal discourse. One way to force your
> nomenclature and mine to be identical is to say that "share knowledge
> base" and interpersonal discourse" are completely dependent on physical
> laws which are completely dependent of the shared contingencies. Thus
> our basic thinking process is rooted in the physical objects comprising
> our brain. These physical objects owe their existence to our shared
> contingencies. Here we are developing an equivalence between mental
> processes and physical processes. In other words I can imagine any
> process that the universe is capable of supporting, and it is possible
> to simulate in the universe any thought process that I am capable of
> imagining.<br>
> <br>
> George<br>
> </body>
> </html>
> 
> --------------000108000004070700050202--


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