Hi David,

Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 15:47, David Nyman a écrit :
> I'm not sure that Nick Bostrom et al actually take this view.  Rather
> the notion seems to be based on the assumptions that if this is a
> feasible thing to do, and unless you could rule out that *some* future
> civilisation would actually do it, then the huge number of 'observer
> moments' thus generated would make it probable that we were in fact
> living in one.  I don't think there are any other assumptions about the
> motivations of the simulaters.

what puzzle's me about this, is that accepting this argument (which as similar 
root with the doomsday argument) is accepting also this:
(here follows assumption about a pure materialist mwi).

1- Materialist mwi alla everett is true.
2- So there exist world in the plenitude which have a lot of observer.
3- Then it is more likely that I'm in a branch where a lot of observer exist.

But I'm not (obsviously)... I'm about the 60 billions human born on this 
earth... and this number seems very low (just only for human life form). If 
(physical) mwi is true then I should be part of a universe with a lot of 
sentient life forms, if not I'm a peculiar case and it should be strange that 
I am. So the argument that I should be in a simulation because the majority 
of OM should be in a simulation (because we can't rule out that our future 
civilisations will simulate us if it is possible), means also that we should 
be in a universe that has plenty of sentient life forms (but it seems we're 
not). So my question is simply this :

- Why accepting the simulation argument is "simpler" than accepting 
the "multitude sentient life forms hypothesis" ? ;)

Best regards,
Quentin

P.S.: I would like to apology to "W.C.", sometimes my thoughts are quicker 
than my fingers /o\
P.S.2: I also apology form my horrible english ;) One day, I'll be a perfect 
english speaker, but this day hasn't come yet.

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